

Cultural Diversity and Biculturalism: Congruences and Contrasts in Arts Policies and Practices between New Zealand and England

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Abstract

A comparison of approaches to biculturalism in New Zealand and cultural diversity in England reveals that both countries use policy in ways that are aspirational and prescriptive rather than descriptive of cultural practice. Hybrid culture, producing influential and acclaimed work in the field, is largely ignored in policy in favour of support for distinct minorities. The reasons for this are explored through a brief comparative survey of the history, development and current political purpose of cultural policy in both countries, and contrasts made with current cultural practice and with the social and economic status of minorities in each country.

Keywords

Biculturalism, diversity, cultural policy.

“Cultural diversity, in all its forms, is posing a profound challenge to traditional formulations of cultural policy. In most countries the artistic and cultural landscape has not evolved to reflect the realities of a changed social landscape.”¹

Air New Zealand utilises the Maori *koru* design on the tail fins of its aircraft: a cultural, rather than natural symbol, and one reflecting the culture of only 15% of its current population.² Chris Ofili, a Black British artist of Nigerian descent, famous in the popular press for his paintings incorporating elephant dung, represented Britain at the last Venice Biennale. What do these national representations tell us about the status of various cultural traditions within these countries? Do they appear as a reflection of state policies, and are they an accurate expression of the balance of power between diverse cultures in these countries? Does cultural production in both countries tell another story?

While extensive work exists on the history and present state of biculturalism in New Zealand,³ this has been based largely on philosophical, art-historical or socio-historical approaches. There is little research that relates its development to national arts policies and little that compares New Zealand bicultural policy and practice with those of cultural diversity elsewhere. It is also mainly written by New Zealand academics and oriented to a readership assumed to be familiar with New Zealand history and current cultural politics. Consequently what seem to a non-New Zealander to be some of the defining features of New Zealand cultural policy (such as the great prominence given to Maori culture, and the consequent eclipsing of cultural diversity) are often taken as read in published discussions. One intention here is to outline sufficient of New Zealand and UK cultural history and current policy to make the topic comprehensible to an international readership, and to bring an outside perspective to some of the burning questions of internal New Zealand discourse on bi-culturalism in relation to arts policy.

Cultural policy is a fertile field for analysis of national political intent. Hugoson (1997) has argued the aspirational nature of cultural policy which is so often expressed in terms of abstract goals, to create a sense of national identity and to support an official ideology, without any obvious means of achievement.⁴ Organisations responsible for the implementation of the policy invent their own actions to address it, and if they succeed, portray them as consequent on the policy. The looseness of this arrangement means that national cultural policies are free to express ideals and state cultural organisations are free to interpret them. So in the field of cultural diversity, we can seek national intent in abstract policy aims, and see how it is understood in practice in patterns of official funding, display and distribution. We can then usefully compare that with cultural production which is not determined by government control or support, to discover if this accords with government intention: in other words, does cultural policy support cultural practice as it is happening or does it seek to manipulate it for political ends? I shall argue that policies arising from current political aspirations to inclusiveness and cultural relativism do not necessarily produce a convincing, or realistic, image of current or historical relations between different ethnic communities. The policy treatment of "multicultural arts" always essentially raises questions of segregation or integration, in which political as well as cultural aims are manifest. I shall argue that it is political prescriptivism, rather than cultural description, that has driven recent policy-making in this field in New Zealand and England. Social harmony, paradoxically together with the protection of cultural difference, seem to be aims in both countries, while in New Zealand, we see additionally a conscious adaptation of Maori motifs and words to represent national New Zealand culture, a development unparalleled in other settler cultures. However, in the UK and only since the turn of the twenty-first century, culturally diverse art is also becoming incorporated into national representations.

An attempt to compare New Zealand and the UK will face the immediate accusation of comparing apples with oranges. Any transnational cultural comparison has to balance the rigour of finding truly comparable contexts with the need to reflect national distinctiveness.⁵ In making policy comparisons, the researcher must take account not only of historical, ideological, social and policy environments, but also of the availability of data, differences in their criteria of collection, and of administrative structures and the social protection system in the countries concerned. Furthermore the preconceptions and values of the researcher that affect all research approaches are particularly prominent in a field of such political intensity as cultural diversity. For all these reasons it is not possible to find strictly comparable criteria in national policy-making contexts, but in an argument that seeks to explain similarity and difference, it is useful to outline the greatest divergences and closest congruences.

Both New Zealand and the UK can now legitimately be called multicultural societies, but their routes to this position could hardly be more different. Most fundamentally, New Zealand is a settler culture⁶ while England was a colonising nation. The implications of this basic difference are far-reaching. The process of contact between British and non-European culture developed in almost reciprocal ways: in the UK, other cultures are diasporic: they were imported and mixed with a British core, while in New Zealand, British culture was imported and superimposed on a Maori base. This distinction is also the reason for the current status of non-white culture in each country. The diasporic character of cultural diversity in Britain means that there was always a homeland elsewhere that could maintain traditions, so new, hybrid cultural mixtures in the UK were not necessarily a threat to the preservation of the originating culture. But in New Zealand the position is much more complicated and ambivalent. However far Maori culture was repressed, it always retained its autochthonous status.⁷ This designation locates it as a part of the natural landscape, itself the subject of colonisation. In this respect it has more in common with the treatment of the Celtic "home nations" of the UK by the English. Its demise was seen by colonists as inevitable but regrettable, often simultaneously with its

active suppression. At the same time it offered the possibility of distinctiveness in the formulation of a new national culture, which has been exploited by New Zealanders for 150 years. But this involves hybridisation, which threatens the purity of traditional culture: which for the Maori, had nowhere else to maintain it.

Despite these core differences, however, some of the contrasts in the history of cultural development have been mitigated by subsequent ideological social and political trends common to New Zealand and the UK. The immigrations into Britain were matched by a movement of rural Maori into the cities of New Zealand,⁸ and an influx of Polynesians.⁹ The minority rights movements of the 1960s and 70s impacted upon policy making in both countries. Both countries were facing the implications of the increasing unacceptability of colonial suppression of non-dominant cultures and both attempted to redress the balance through policies that seek to re-instate the value of these oppressed cultures. In New Zealand this took the form of Maori demonstrations and protests about the full implementation of the Treaty of Waitangi, resulting in the Treaty Act of 1975 which renewed its legal force and the need for bi-cultural approaches in state funded organisations. In Britain the Commission for Racial Equality was established in 1976 and the Minority Arts Advisory Service set up. This too was in the midst of riots and demonstrations by both Black activists, and counter-protests from the Far Right.¹⁰ In both countries these shifts took place alongside changes in state arts policy, from support for traditional “high” arts to the promotion of participatory and community arts activity. Administrative systems are also similar. The countries have similar levels of personal taxation¹¹ supporting similar levels of state provision and control. In democratic societies this implies a common level of individual engagement with, and responsibility for, state services and serves to create a common understanding of citizenship. Both countries fund the arts with roughly equal amounts from taxation and the proceeds of state lottery.¹² Both control and manage arts funding from arts councils set up by, but nominally independent of, government. Both countries have arts policies that attempt to encourage the development and exhibition/performance of culturally diverse arts, but both (in policy terms) still segregate this activity from “the mainstream”.

British culture in the UK has been shaped by Indian, African and Far Eastern influences since at least the seventeenth century, but up to World War II these had always been welcome admixtures, not threats. Elements of other cultures were consciously and confidently absorbed as curiosities (e.g. the adoption of “Chinoiserie” in eighteenth century design, or of “Hindoo” architecture at Brighton Pavilion and of Indian textile motifs) or as key characteristics (tea-drinking, cotton clothing, the sugar trade and later, curry).¹³ For the British, these influences came in commodities and artefacts imported from, or visits made to, empire outposts. But within the UK large-scale encounter with people from other cultures did not take place until the post World War II immigrations from the Commonwealth, when the domestic political effects of having a diverse population were first taken seriously. It was at this point that issues of cultural integration or segregation arose¹⁴ and soon began to affect cultural policy. Its designation as policy for “ethnic minorities communities 'arts’” (1976) indicates that the intention was limited to the enabling of homespun participatory work within those communities, not the presentation of their art to, or within, the mainstream. As British-born Black people became artistically active, the terminology shifted to “ethnic arts” (no “minorities” or “communities”) at the time when hippy culture, Asian food and clothing began to be adopted by young white British. Later came the term “multicultural arts”: implying equality between various cultures. This was reflected in policy emphases on building audiences from all backgrounds for Black arts. The current term “cultural diversity” encompasses not only various separate traditions, but also mixtures between them. But throughout the late twentieth century policies, staff and budgets for such arts remained segregated. Quotas of expenditure were demanded: 4% by 1988, and then again at various levels in various bodies in 1997. It was only in 1994 that designated Arts Council unit for “arts

access” was closed , its work to be integrated into mainstream activity. All this had the effect of increasing expenditure on Black arts, while ensuring that it continued to be regarded as separate from other British culture. And it is only at the turn of the twenty - first century that the question of “what constitutes Britishness ?” is being debated, and that as much because of devolution of the constituent nations of the UK as because of extensive non-indigenous cultural admixture.

Current arts policy for culturally diverse arts in England continues to maintain elements of segregation, with regional arts council offices having designated cultural diversity officers and in some cases, separate budgets. It is one of four main priorities for the Arts Council, which has tackled this since 2002 through a special short-term project called Decibel: Raising the Voice of Culturally Diverse Arts in Britain. With a budget of £5million, and a further £5.7million ring-fenced within the Arts Council grants budget, the project aims to make cultural diversity part of the mainstream in terms of showing of work, employment, governance, and numbers of grant applications. The project does not discriminate between traditional and “hybrid” work but focuses on arts and artists from African, Asian and Caribbean backgrounds who live and work in Britain. The project describes such work as “*this provocative, diverse, growing and very British cultural phenomenon*”.¹⁵ Its description as “British” suggests assimilation, and the award of prestigious British prizes to culturally hybrid work further suggests the wish of official bodies to profile it as British.

In New Zealand cultural contact was a consequence of , rather than a precursor to , personal meetings between Maori and settler. From the start culture was one aspect of contact and confrontation that also involved social, economic and military power struggles. It therefore has always had the political dimension that in Britain was noticed only in the 1950s. The question of “amalgamating” the Maori had already arisen by the 1830s. Settler culture in New Zealand was not gently incorporated into the distinctive and well-established culture of the Maori. The two cultures have coexisted since first contact, despite differing power balances between them.

Although the eventual dominance of the colonists was certain to them from the outset, it has never been as complete, or assured, as in other settler countries, and never as supremely confident as the British could afford to be in adopting elements of the culture of their empire. The whole of the first century of contact (1770s to 1870s) was characterised by ambivalent relations: the ferocity of Maori opposition to land seizure by settlers both infuriated and impressed the colonists.¹⁶ Banks, the botanist travelling with Captain Cooke in 1776, like many early visitors to New Zealand, displays a slightly condescending curiosity towards Maori art¹⁷ but a respect for Maori resistance to the incomers¹⁸. For the next fifty years, the Maori were in control of cultural borrowings from settlers, who at this date constituted informal groups of traders and whalers, dependant for food and raw materials on the tolerance of their Maori hosts. Like the English in the UK, the Maori were the unthreatened majority who benefited from trade with immigrants, and could choose from their offerings whatever suited their material and cultural needs. It was not until the establishment of formal colonial government in New Zealand in the 1830s and 40s that the situation changed.

Significantly for the future of cultural relations, colonisation did not follow the path of virtual extermination of First Nation culture taken in the other settler nations of Australia and Canada. It could not. The early years of dependence on, and fear of, the Maori made approaches to integrated national government careful and cautious. Sinclair and Dalziel (2000) argue that the small scale of the land and the density of Maori population required settler and Maori to live in proximity. Pearson (1990) notes that as settler culture was based largely on pastoralism and the supply of agricultural produce to Britain, there was little call to incorporate Maori into capitalist work relationships so they

were able to coexist, retaining their own culture. Colonisation also took place much later than in other settler countries, after the abolition of slavery in the British Empire (1837), in a period of conscious humanism and evangelism, in which imperial greed was to some extent tempered by concern for human rights and knowledge of the impact of ignoring them.¹⁹ The Treaty of Waitangi (1840) was considered to enshrine these concepts, which is why it proved such a powerful tool for restoration of rights and land in the Maori protests of the 1970s and 80s.

New Zealand was, of course, itself a British colony and part of the Commonwealth. The retreat from colonial attitudes in the latter half of the twentieth century therefore affected not only Maori-white relations, but also those of New Zealand with the UK. It has been argued that in a post-colonial society, the colonists must redefine themselves in terms not based upon colonial power.²⁰ For white New Zealanders this meant a shift of orientation of New Zealand from being an outpost of Britain to a Pacific nation. Many manifestations of this were economic: from the inception of the European Union in 1964, European economic protection policies forced New Zealand to seek new markets. Exports to Britain fell from 80% of the total in 1930 to 9% in 1985, and were replaced by trade with Japan, Australia, the USSR. New Zealand troops were withdrawn from European theatres, and then from SE Asia. Aid was concentrated on the Pacific Islands (over 80% by 1985). But it was the Rainbow Warrior incident that threw an international spotlight on New Zealand's new Pacific outlook: after threats from the US of trade sanctions if New Zealand did not allow nuclear ships into its waters, in 1985 the Greenpeace flagship was attacked and sunk in Waitemata harbour in Auckland by French secret service agents. This blatant sabotage outraged New Zealanders and consolidated internal support for the independent, Pacific-oriented stance.

This was reflected in cultural policy and practice. Indigenous reference had long been a source of distinctiveness in the development of New Zealand national identity, but it became explicit in government strategy in recent years first with the official adoption of bi-culturalism as policy principle, and then through the appropriation of Maori art and motifs as national symbols. In the wake of Maori resurgence, it was built into New Zealand policy in most spheres of state control from the 1980s, from health care to the adoption of Maori as an official language, which now appears alongside, and, more surprisingly, mixed with, English in government documents. Biculturalism axiomatically stresses relationships between two cultures assumed to be distinct and coexistent. There are many definitions, from "The conscious confrontation and reconciliation of two conflicting value systems, both of which are accepted as valid" (Schwimmer 1960) to "a multicultural ideal...restricted to the relationship between New Zealand's "charter groups", Pakeha and Maori "(Pearson (1990). All definitions, however, assume the distinctiveness and separation of two equal cultures, and this is expressed in the policy for, and funding, display and rhetoric of, official cultural practice in New Zealand.

The role of policy both to create identity and to foster an ideal of biculturalism is overt. *The Heart of the Nation: a cultural strategy for Aotearoa New Zealand* (2000) states that government cultural policy's purpose is:

"to nurture and sustain vibrant arts and cultural activities....through which a strong cultural identity can emerge"

and further:

"It is the intention of this strategy that things Maori should be devolved to Maori." and "we are not proposing that biculturalism be abandoned, but redefined" (p84).

The strategy proposes the creation of a Ministry of Maori, Arts, Culture and Heritage, structurally positioned as an exact parallel to an unattributed, and hence presumably white New Zealand, Ministry of Arts, Culture and Heritage. In arts funding the same principle prevails: The New Zealand Arts Council, Creative New Zealand, has separate board, staff and funding streams for Maori affairs, as it does for Pacific arts. It has instituted the use of a special symbol (toi iho) to guarantee “authenticity” in Maori art, thus emphasising its separate identity. The symbol can also be used (so designated) for “co-production” of Maori with non-Maori work, again stressing distinctiveness rather than mixture. Even a work *combining* both cultures (Maori singing with European flutes, for Waitangi Day 2003), evoked the comment: *“I was struck by the sound of two cultures reaching out to each other”* from the Arts Council's chief executive.²¹ One effect of New Zealand bicultural policy is to discourage (within the funded sector) the possibilities of creative mixtures that utilise a variety of culturally diverse elements. Another, because of its emphasis on authenticity and tradition, is to define “Maori arts” as those that fit a folkloric stereotype.

In terms of state-funded bicultural art, the first internationally prominent manifestation was the exhibition entitled *Te Maori* which toured prestigious venues in the USA in 1984. This presented Maori artefacts in modern western “white cube” displays, accompanied by curatorial conferences with academic papers. This positioned the artefacts as “fine art” in the western understanding. This status was developed in the new national museum of New Zealand, Te Papa Tangarewa, planned from the mid 1980s and opening in 1998 with separate displays of traditional Maori art and settler artefacts. The museum occupies a flagship site and its intention is consciously nation-building.²² As in *Te Maori*, Maori sections are displayed and presented as high art, while the settler art is provided with a largely ethnographic interpretation. The museum has since become a focus of critical debate about how far the displays reflect the actuality of New Zealand society, and how far they idealise it.²³

At the same time there is evidence of some discomfort with biculturalism as an appropriate principle for the future. This is apparent implicitly in the appropriation of Maori words, symbols and concepts by white New Zealand institutions, and explicitly in expressions of the growing awareness of the multi-ethnicity of modern New Zealand, and the likely hood that this will increase. At present, in addition to the enlarging Maori population, it comprises 4% Asian, 9% ethnically mixed, making a total of 28% non-white. *The Heart of the Nation* mentions both these trends, paradoxically using the word Pakeha throughout to refer to white New Zealanders while noting its unacceptability to 90% of white New Zealanders. The adoption of logos based on Maori motifs for national New Zealand enterprises is itself a denial of bi-culturalism, since it mixes the two cultures. It can be viewed as a kind of cultural imperialism,²⁴ or less controversially, as a shift into a type of cultural diversity that does not seek to preserve and distinguish separate elements. Such a shift is anticipated in *The Heart of the Nation*:

*“It is questionable whether (bicultural and multicultural discourses) are adequate as a template for the future development of strategic thinking in the cultural sector ... a danger of current understandings of both bicultural and multicultural policies is their backward-looking focus on the reproductive processes of culture.”*²⁵

and from Statistics New Zealand, noting a population already 25% non-white, *“We may be shaping the character of a culturally inclusive Kiwi ethnicity”*²⁶ The hesitancy of these comments is understandable. Since the principle of biculturalism has been rediscovered in the words of the Treaty, and this has been re-re-interpreted as the essential founding document of the constitution, any shift away from biculturalism towards cultural diversity carries enormous moral implications. It would also bring asymmetry to the current

official balance of Maori and white culture, and risk the strongly preservatory strand of policy and financial support for Maori arts.

But in terms of current cultural production, it is not the funding available through special arts council initiatives for either biculturalism or cultural diversity that is enabling the most influential, acclaimed and even popular work. In both countries, quite apart from the obvious examples of food, film and popular music, it is arts that take their inspiration from several cultures, and the excitement of mixtures between them, that is attracting international attention. Besides his representation of Britain at Venice, Chris Ofili won the prestigious Turner Prize. Anish Kapoor is remodelling the underground in Naples. Hanif Kureishi, Zadie Smith and Monica Ali all write about the experience of being Asian British to great critical acclaim. Yinka Shonibare, describing himself as a “post-colonial hybrid” incorporates into his paintings West African prints purchased in London and manufactured in Korea. In New Zealand, despite the rhetoric of biculturalism, outside the funded sector new forms are developing that genuinely mix elements not only of Maori and white New Zealand culture, but also influences from elsewhere. Jacqueline Fraser uses electric cable, rather than fibre, for weaving, producing forms traditionally executed in sculpture, thus substituting a modern for a traditional medium, and a female for a male art form.; William Dunning parodies Victorian furniture in drawings of fictive monuments incorporating motifs based on First Nation carvings from across the world. In tourist art too, Polynesian influences combine with Maori elements on T-shirts made in China. Instead of biculturalism, this is an expression of something closer to Bennett's definition of cultural diversity for Europe:

“ It is no longer adequate to to think about the relations between cultures in a society in the form of their compartmentalised division into separate ways of life and identities. It is rather the flows and cross-overs between cultures that has to be attended to, and the patterns of their intermingling that are produced by the movement of peoples, and, of course, the restless cultural mixing that now characterises the organisation of all developed cultural markets.”²⁷

It seems that in Britain, all this is happening quite independently of official arts policies, and in New Zealand, in spite of them. Nor are the policies reflective of real social and economic balances. In both countries there are blatant inequalities of educational attainment, income, social and economic status between white majorities and non-white minorities. Methods of collecting statistics vary between the UK and New Zealand so accurate comparison is difficult, but the disadvantage of minorities is sustained, persistent and widely acknowledged. Even within the cultural sector, in which ideal narratives of cultural harmony are unfolded, actual inequalities are clear. In a poll of 17 large arts organisations in England in 2003, one Black manager was found, but more than 100 Black catering staff. In New Zealand in 1996, Maori constituted 9% of cultural sector workers. The celebration of culturally diverse arts in the UK, and equality of representation of Maori and white culture in New Zealand are therefore ideological statements by governments keen to use culture to display politically correct aspirations. Both assert their commitment to the minorities by privileging their culture rather than through expensive and time-consuming radical social and economic reform. Both, furthermore, have now appropriated it as a distinctive feature of national identity, thus further symbolising an acceptably post-colonial political stance. This is not necessarily an overtly cynical process, but rather an expression of an ideal without any clear strategy for fulfilment, for which national cultural policy has become such an appropriate vehicle.

Notes

- 1 Bennett, T. 2000 . *Differing Diversities: Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity*, Council of Europe.
- 2 This is not a unique example. Others include the Maori gateway that greets international arrivals in Auckland airport, and the adoption of another Maori motif as the logo of the Arts Council of New Zealand
- 3 e.g. Thomas, N. 1999. *Possessions; Indigenous Art/Colonial Culture*, Thames and Hudson, London Pearson, D. 1990. *A Dream Deferred*, Allen and Unwin, Wellington.
- 4 Hugoson, R. 1997. "The rhetoric of Abstract Goals in National Cultural Policies," *Cultural Policy*, 3, 2. 323-340
- 5 The problems of transnational cultural comparison have generated their own extensive literature, e.g. Schuster, M. 1987. "Making compromises to make comparisons in cross-national arts policy research", *Journal of Cultural Economics* 2 1-36; Hantrais, Mangen, O'Brien (eds) 1985-9. *Cross-national research papers, series 1: Doing cross-national research*, European Research Centre, Loughborough University, UK.
- 6 Defined as a culture in which Europeans settled, dispossessed and eventually outnumbered indigenous people: therefore Australia, New Zealand, Canada (but not India or S. Africa.) (Thomas (1999) p.8)
- 7 Although, in fact, the Maori were themselves colonists of New Zealand from about the thirteenth century.
- 8 In 1945 20% of Maori lived in cities, by 1976 76% did so.
- 9 38000 in Auckland by 1976.
- 10 The 1976 Notting Hill Carnival (London) ended in violence between police and Black youths; 1977 saw a National Front march through London.
- 11 In New Zealand 19.5% - 39%; in the UK 20% -40%.
- 12 In New Zealand state funding provides \$13.5 million for 2003-4; lottery \$18.5. In the UK the proportions are similar.
- 13 A comprehensive discussion of the relationship between British culture and that of its empire can be found in Said, E. 1994. *Culture and Imperialism*, Vintage, London.
- 14 In 1968 far-right politician Enoch Powell gave his famous "rivers of blood" speech in the House of Commons, advocating mass deportation of immigrants. Martin Luther King was assassinated in the same year.
- 15 Khan., N . 2003. *Reinventing Britain* (The Guardian, special edition, no date)
- 16 The Maori were described by army historian J.W. Fortescue as "the grandest native enemy he had ever encountered"; but between 1860 and 1892 they had lost or sold 17 million acres of land to white settlers. (Sinclair , K. and Dalziel, R. 2000. *A New History of New Zealand*, Penguin, NZ, Auckland. Chapter 6.)
- 17 "...the truth with which lines were drawn was surprising...." Banks, J. (ed.Beaglehole 1962) *The Endeavour Journal of Joseph Banks, 1768-1771* , vol2, p.24.
- 18 Almost every encounter of the Maori with the Endeavour was overtly hostile: at the first sighting of Maori (Oct.8 1769) "the pinnacle came to (our)assistance, fired upon them and killed the chief; at the second (next day) "we thought it prudent to retreat till the marines were landed"; Oct 10: "we now despaired of making peace with men who were not be frightened by our small arms." and so it continued. Citations from Banks, (ed. Beaglehole, 1962.)
- 19 Instructions to the first governor of New Zealand, Hobson (1839) required him "to mitigate the process of war and spoliation, under which uncivilised tribes have invariably disappeared as often as they have been brought into the immediate vicinity of Emigrants from the Nations of Christendom." Quoted Sinclair, K. and Dalziel, R (2000) p. 69.
- 20 Spoonley, P. 1995. "Constructing ourselves: the post-colonial politics of Pakeha,," in *Justice and Identity: Antipodean Practices*, eds. Wilson, M. and Yeatman, A. Bridget Williams Books, Wellington,.
- 21 Creative New Zealand Annual Report 2003 ,p.4
- 22 "It will express the bicultural nature of the country, recognising the mana and significance of each of the two mainstreams of tradition and cultural heritage, and providing the means for each to contribute effectively to a statement of the nation's identity." *A concept for the Museum of NZTPW* (Wellington 1989) quoted Brown, M. (2002)
- 23 Brown, M . 2002. Representing the body of a nation: the art exhibitions of New Zealand's national Museum, *Third Text*, 16,3, 285-294.

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- 24 Tapsell, P. 1998. *Taonga: a tribal response to museums* (PhD thesis, University of Oxford, UK)
- 25 *The Heart of the Nation, A Cultural Strategy for Aotearoa New Zealand* , 2000. p.84
- 26 Statistics New Zealand website (www.stats.govt.nz)
- 27 Bennett, T . (2001) p.53