No Discord or an Area without Significant Political Stakes?
Some Reflections on Swedish Postwar Cultural Policy Discourse

Anders Frenander
Göteborg University/University College of Borås

Anders Frenander has a PhD in History of Ideas and Science at Göteborg University. He is senior lecturer in Library and Information Science at Göteborg University/University College of Borås. He is also the director of Centre for Cultural Policy Research, Borås.

Abstract
The aim of this paper is to give a broad sketch of the Swedish cultural policy discourse during the 20th century, with special reference to the specific features of Swedish history. Particular focus is on the political and ideological hegemony of the social democratic Folkhem (the Home for the People) period from the 1930s to the 1980s. Analytically, the discourse may be divided into four different periods. Each of these periods, in various respects, goes back to certain fundamental propositions that underpin the idea of the Folkhem. The paper tries to show that the same discursive logic is still with us even today, after the downfall of the Folkhem model in the 1980s.

The regulative principle at the heart of the discourse is that the concept of culture in policy strategies first and foremost has to be the conventional aesthetic concept of high culture.

Keywords
Cultural policy, concept of culture, discourse, Folkhem.

Introduction
In this paper I will deal with the discourse on Swedish cultural policy during the 20th century with special emphasis on the postwar period, and ending in 1996.

Swedish cultural policy is guided by overarching national goal formulations. So far, there have been two such documents decided upon by the Swedish parliament. The first one was taken in 1974 and the second one 1996. The account in this paper will take as its point of departure a preliminary comparison of the contents of the two documents.

In 1974 the goals of Swedish cultural policy were:

- to contribute to the protection of freedom of expression and to create genuine opportunities for this freedom to be utilised
- to give people the opportunity of creative activity of their own and to promote contacts between people
- to counteract the negative effects of commercialism within the cultural sector
- to promote decentralisation of activities and decision making functions within the cultural sector
- to let policy increasingly be shaped with reference to the experiences and needs of underprivileged groups
• to facilitate artistic and cultural renewal
• to guarantee that the culture of older times is conserved and vitalised
• promote an exchange of experiences and ideas within the cultural sector across linguistic and national divides\(^1\).

In 1996 these goals were changed, and their wordings are now

• to safeguard freedom of expression and create genuine opportunities for all to use that freedom
• to work to create the opportunity for all to participate in cultural life and cultural experiences and to engage in creative activities of their own
• to promote cultural diversity, artistic renewal and quality, thereby counteracting the negative effects of commercialism
• to make it possible for culture to be a dynamic, challenging and independent force in society
• to preserve and use the cultural heritage
• to promote education
• to promote international cultural exchange and meetings between cultures within Sweden\(^2\).

A quick glance at these two goal formulations reveals that they are rather similar. Against the background of profound societal change and dramatic political upheavals in Sweden as well as internationally, this might seem a bit odd, I think.

To just put it briefly; between 1974 and 1996, we experienced in Sweden the downfall of the hegemonic social, economic and political model of the so called Folkhem (the Home for the People – for an explanation of the term, see below). And on the global level we saw the dismantling of the Soviet Empire and the end of the Cold War. Associated with these developments was the rise of a powerful neo-liberal ideological outlook, especially, of course, in the UK and the US (under Thatcher and Reagan, respectively) but also, to a certain degree, in Sweden.

In spite of those big changes cultural policy appears relatively unaffected. How are we to understand this? I think that we have to go back in history and look at the cultural policy discourse on the one hand, and, on the other, inquire into the mechanisms of the hegemonic Folkhem model, that commanded much of social development in Sweden between the 1930s and the 1980s. In other words, we will outline a view on Swedish 20th century history, examine the dynamics of the Swedish Model or the Folkhem, from the 1930s and on and discuss the discourse on cultural policy in relation to that. Here I largely rely on an interpretation put forward by a Swedish historian of ideas, who has devoted the last fifteen years to studying this subject, Tomas Jonsson. The theoretical inspiration for his work draws on Gramsci’s notion of "hegemony", and some traits of Laclau’s and Mouffe’s elaboration of that concept in connection with their discourse theory. Other sources of inspiration are the British political scientist Bob Jessop and his Danish colleague Jacob Torfing. I shall shortly give an account of their ‘three-sphere-model’ that helps us to understand the mechanisms of the Folkhem hegemony.
Four Periods of Discourse

But let us first get an overview of how the discourse has run during these years. This is done in order to outline the strategy of analysis adopted here – highlighting two logics in close relation to each other. The discourse on Swedish cultural policy might, roughly, be divided into four periods. The first one depicts the prehistory, when the notion of cultural policy was actually non-existent. The people involved did not use the expression, rather they were talking about education policy or the like, very often using the Swedish word “bildning”, which is equivalent with the German “Bildung”. This period covers the time before 1945.

The second period might be described as a period when the debate occasionally was quite intense, but still rather scattered. Here we must focus on the publication of two reports or books. The first one was the Cultural Programme of the Communist Party in 1946. This was the first party programme on cultural matters ever to meet the public. The second one was the book by a committee within the Social Democratic Party reporting on the general state of man and society, entitled Människan och nutiden (Man and Contemporary Times), 1952. Neither of these reports generated any general debate, though, nor did they prompt any political decisions or legislation. This period lasted up to around 1958.

Period number three is the most intensive one, where most of the action in Swedish cultural policy discourse has taken place. It started with a ministerial speech in 1959, reminding the public of the importance of cultural matters, and how they had been neglected by politicians. Another impetus was a little book by an activist in the adult education movement in 1962. Those two events, together with other factors which I will come back to, sparked an intense debate during the whole decade, leading up to the decision on the first goals concerning national cultural policy. This period ran from 1959 to 1974.

The fourth, and last, period obviously started with the decision in 1974 and the successive establishment of what you might call the cultural bureaucracy at different levels of public administration. The system was put to work and worked quite well, as a matter of fact. Although the debate died down, it did not disappear totally. From time to time you can find articles in the magazines of the political parties, and one or another book debating the issue was published. Eventually, the need for a new decision on the national goals was strongly felt, and the second formulation of goals was decided upon 1996. The duration of this fourth period, then, is 1974–1996.

Of course, one might say that we now are in a fifth period, working under the second decision. That is obviously true, but as my investigation stops at 1996, no account on the present discourse is therefore given here.

The Swedish Folkhem

The establishment of the Folkhem (the Home for the People) rested on a chain of specific compromises formed during the 1930s. These compromises constituted a strong foundation from which it was possible to launch a project regarding a specific kind of welfare state that had far-reaching implications for Swedish politics during the rest of 20th century.

It may be said that the project already started on the ideological level in the 1920s. In short, the Swedish Social Democrats (the SAP) transformed itself from a “class party” to a “people’s party”. The main political concern changed from class interests to a more
nationalist and popular approach. From being a staunch defender and advocate of the interests of the working class, more or less in a traditional Marxist fashion of the Second International, the party broadened its focus and began to claim that the entire nation’s people as a whole was subject to capitalist exploitation. Either as a producer – the workers being exploited in their daily wage labour; or as a consumer – more or less everyone paying too much for the daily goods at the local store, or heavy rents for housing.

In this context the party also took a firm hold on the trade unions, thereby starting a process of centralising power within the worker’s movement as a whole.

The next step was taken on the political level. This happened through an agreement, the so-called horse-trading, between the SAP and the peasants’ party in 1933. The two parties struck a deal regarding milk prices, paving the way for parliamentary co-operation and safeguarding a firm political majority, which SAP otherwise lacked on its own.

Finally, in 1938, this kind of consensus creation was taken to the economic level. But this time the centralisation of the labour movement paid off; the famous Saltsjöbaden Treaty (an historic pact) was settled by the two main organisations on the labour market. On the workers’ side, LO (the Trade Union Council) and on the side of the employers, SAF (the Swedish Employers’ Association), came to an agreement that basically regulated the interaction between the two parties for almost four decades.

These compromises opened up a scope for possible political action which created strong connections between three fundamental social spheres:

*Figure 1:*

![Diagram showing state, civil society, and economy]

The result of these compromises was a social, political and ideological hegemony (or historic bloc) with the SAP as the ‘leading partner’. The Folkhem ideology turned out to be a discourse with more or less all the characteristics ‘prescribed’ by discourse theory. For example, the mechanism of exclusion was very efficient, as we are going to see. A
very important trait of the discourse of the project was its national(istic) inclination. All the Swedes were to be included, but as discourse theory tells us, for a group (or an ideological position) to be included there has to be some ‘other’ to be excluded. In this case the then Swedish Prime Minister, Per Albin Hansson, was quite clear. In a speech delivered at Worker’s Day 1933 he stigmatized the Swedish Communists, or the “Bolsheviks”, as he called them, for “aping foreign examples and obeying slogans from abroad”. “Be Swedish”, he admonished, and in several articles and speeches around 1930 he reiterated that the Bolsheviks had to be “driven out” of the labour movement. The exclusion of the Communists from the Folkhem community was, according to my view, to have important repercussions on Swedish cultural policy and I will return to that issue later.

During the 1950s and 1960s the politics of the Social Democrats successively tightened the links between the spheres. One example is the principle of solidarity applied to the wage policy that LO launched in early the 1950s. The strategy in this case was to combine a high wage-rate with a modern and efficient industry, and thus a high level of productivity. It symbiotically tied workers and employers closer to each other. At the same time this conciliatory approach and the outcome of their negotiations and cooperation helped reinforce or strengthen the system as a whole.

During those two decades this hegemony experienced its heydays. It was actually working extremely well – even in view of the fact that the world all over went through a period of unprecedented progress (not seen after either). Almost regardless of what measure – economic growth, improved health care, expected length of life, popular education level, and female emancipation and so on – Sweden rated among the most successful nations in the world. The rumour of the “Swedish Model” spread around the globe.

All political measures and initiatives taken by the SAP (who held the reigns of governmental power all through this period) were designed to enforce the links between the three spheres thereby getting the whole system to work better and generate ever more welfare for the inhabitants of the Folkhem. In actual fact, all these measures also worked in the direction of the centralisation of power in the model. Whether regarding the trade unions (LO) or the political party (SAP) the decisive power lay with the national leadership. Hardly any right to make decisions remained at the local level, even legal strike activities had to be authorised by LO’s National Board.

This eventually led to an exhaustion of the system’s driving forces. Essentially the internal dynamics of the Folkhem hegemony turned around to become a force tearing it apart from the inside. The model began to be attacked from different angles. In 1969 a big wildcat strike broke out in the iron mines in northern Sweden involving thousands of militant workers. This strike not only undermined the power structure in the labour unions but also raised a question mark regarding the fundamental regulations of the Saltsjöbaden agreement of 1938, that is, the very basis for the Swedish Model.

But also the employers challenged the way the system worked. 1976 they withdrew from the collective bargaining agreement and therewith another basic principle from 1938 was shattered.

Many other signs of stagnation began to show in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Apart from the internal factors cited above there were, of course, also important external factors at play which caused the Swedish Model to break down. There is no need to go into detail here. Let me just point to the shock-wave that the 1974 oil crisis sent through Western industrial societies and to the basic restructuring of the economy that the
advanced capitalist countries were forced to undertake, a process eventually leading to
the so called post-industrial society.

The political strategy of the Social Democrats was to turn its back on the ideas of the
Folkhem. The links between the three spheres successively weakened and changed
shape and in the 1990s we by and large had entered into another political and economic
regime, even if this process is not yet is definitely settled. Although many indications
point in the same, neo-liberal, direction, the situation is still open, at least to some extent.
Anyhow, the in-depth-analysis of the current social and economic formation will have to
wait some time, I think.

This transformation of the Swedish society can be put in a wider context and the
theorisation of it is in many ways equivalent to what Bob Jessop and Jacob Torfing on
the general European level describe as the transition from the Keynesian Welfare State
(KWS) to the Schumpeterian Workfare Regime (SWR). In an even more general sense
you can name it ‘from Fordism to Post-Fordism’, or from ‘Industrial Society to Post-
Industrial Society’ or the advent of ‘Network Society’, and so on.

Cultural Policy Discourse

In the light of all these transformations, then: what happened to Swedish Cultural Policy?
My study, as has been indicated, focuses the discursive level: my material is made up
from political programmes, official investigations, governmental propositions, debate in
the periodicals of the political parties and stuff like that.

The short answer, which I hinted in the Introduction, is - not very much! A deeper look
into the events of the four periods will make this clear.

In the first period, before the Second World War, the discourse on these matters was
rather limited. Within the labour movement there was a sporadic debate on whether
there existed a specific workers’ culture. By that notion was meant a culture separated
from the dominating bourgeois high culture, resting on the working life and general life
conditions of the working class, in different ways mirroring these conditions in creative
processes and artefacts. Those who purported the existence of such a culture belonged
to left wing of the Social Democrats or to the Communist Party. They were not many and
they were rather swiftly marginalised.

This was aptly shown when the Social Democrats rose to power in the 1930s. The
minister for cultural affairs was Arthur Engberg – a great humanist and "Bildung”-
enthusiast, who advocated a view on culture that was not far from the one the British
19th century poet Matthew Arnold had written about. A quote from Engberg’s little
brochure Demokratisk kulturpolitik (Democratic Cultural Policy) is illuminating:

Man also wants to satisfy his yearning for beauty, his artistic desire, his want of what
goes beyond the borders of time and space. He wants to be released and helped out of
the trivial, the dull and grey. The work of art, the book, the creations on stage, the tunes
and the perpetual messages fill, give meaning and inspiration to his life.

After this abstract rhetoric Engberg proceeded to more practical matters; especially, a
general educational reform was of great interest to him, indicating the contents of the
cultural policy of his time. Obviously, it was quite different from the cultural policy we
know today.
The second period of the discourse, which started after the war, showed a little more activity. Several popular movements engaged in the cultural debate, inviting prominent figures to a conference on what tasks the movements might have regarding cultural politics. The outcome of this conference was not very clear. The participants showed pretty much concern about what they reckoned to be the rather weak interest on the part of the people and the workers regarding the bourgeois high culture of an Arnoldian type, but no action was planned.

The debate made a little more headway when Swedish Communist Party launched the first party programme ever on cultural policy in 1946. This centred mainly around what one may describe as "trade union demands". Salient features of the programme were demands on government intervention to break the dominance of monopoly capital within the publishing and film industries. The programme also focussed the need for better educational prospects for theatre and film actors and emphasised necessary improvements in the working conditions of artists, including such things as more studios, more generous scholarships and better payment for artists' work in general.

As I noted above there was also a burgeoning debate within the SAP. In 1952 a party committee presented a report they called Människan och nutiden (Man and Contemporary Times), dealing with an analysis of the late modern society in its very initial stages. The committee adopted a broad, anthropological concept of culture and inquired into several aspects of the rapidly changing Swedish society of that time. The approach was comprehensive and their critical remarks included a wide array of social problems and phenomena, such as an increasingly monotonous working life, the impoverishing of workers' skills, the erosion of old moral and ethical attitudes among the youth and other similar issues. The common tendency of the positions the committee took on all these matters was severely critical towards capitalist society and Western civilization.

Thus, the question about how to deal with the cultural affairs in society was steadily coming closer and closer to the centre of political concerns during the 1950s. The rapid change of everyday life – think about the television, private cars, charter travelling, shorter workday, extended holidays and so on – and the very swift urbanisation raised many questions related to the cultural habits of “common people”. When we enter the third period, all these issues came to the fore and for a decade to come we experienced the most intense debate on cultural matters, ever.

The reasons why this happened were several, but can be divided into two categories. One is structural, and the other has to do with the intervention of agents. It is possible, I think, to identify three structural circumstances. The first one relates to a rather widespread conviction among Swedish politicians, and perhaps especially among Social Democrats. It was widely believed that the rising standard of material life would automatically trigger the partaking of activities related to high culture. But this did not happen. The attainment of more leisure time was not spent on book reading or theatre attendance, but rather on tabloids and at the movies. In a famous speech, which must be labelled the starting point for the Swedish cultural policy endeavours, Ragnar Edenman, the responsible minister condemned “popular culture" in all its different disguises. “Glossy magazines, trashy art, popular music" were not genuine artefacts of high origin, but rather light-weight goods, produced merely for profit maximisation. The conclusion was that the government now had to intervene and financially and otherwise try and support alternatives to the commercial culture industry.

The second reason, as well as the third, has more to do with general international trends. In Sweden, as in many other European welfare countries, the issue of extending the benefits of the welfare society also to artists of different kinds was becoming ever...
more urgent. As Geir Vestheim noted, it was high time to incorporate the cultural field in the overall welfare project\textsuperscript{12}. The living standard of artists, painters, writers and others had fallen severely behind the average worker's pay, and this was of course a disgrace for a modern and equitable society.

The third reason, finally, was pretty concrete. Several European countries (France 1959, Denmark 1961) created government ministries to take care of the cultural affairs. Sweden was something of a slow starter in this respect, but a small department within the ministry for ecclesiastical affairs was set up in 1963. What tasks were to be executed by this department was of course a matter of political debate, generating considerable public attention and interest.

The ‘agency reason’, lastly, is actually the influence of one person, writing a book that was to be extensively discussed for a few years in the beginning of the 1960s. It was Bengt Nerman’s Demokratin’s kultursyn (The Cultural View of Democracy), published in 1962\textsuperscript{13}. One of his main points was that the Swedish adult education movement had too much of an instrumentalist view on the intentions behind their activities. Their image of society was shallow and simplified, Nerman claimed, and rested “on a static picture where society is given, accepted and happy”. No critical questions were raised and the perspective was paternalist and adaptive. Nerman opposed this and meant that it was crucial for each individual to make his or her own choice. He also emphasised “the right to be different and to refrain from denying one’s own proper self”. The great existential questions in life, he hoped, would be the central concern of a more serious and radical cultural movement\textsuperscript{14}.

All these reasons triggered, for the rest of the 1960s, a debate on cultural policy issues that we have not seen since. As indicated above, it started from different points of departure and developed into different directions.

Nerman’s sophisticated and complicated argument was rather narrow-mindedly interpreted by some liberal debaters and their rendering was to dominate the first exchange of reactions to his book. For them, his thoughts opened up for a kind of cultural relativism that pointed to cultural artefacts as a mere merchandise or commodities. Consequently, they hailed the market to be the only institution in society where the value of cultural activities and artefacts really could be measured. If something is meaningful to me, the logic of the argument ran, then I am prepared to pay for it, so it is up to my individual consideration if it has any value or not\textsuperscript{15}. This kind of commercial, market-oriented view of culture as a commodity, was certainly the hottest issue, but not the only one.

Apart from the feature I just mentioned the discussion also launched the idea of cultural policy as “social environment policy”. The notion was to a large extent an echo of the broad critique of modern industrial society of the 1950s, based on a utilisation of the anthropological concept of culture. This concept, in itself, was of course also a matter of dispute. New interpretations, to a large extent inspired by Raymond Williams’s various books entered into the discourse. His thoughts, combined with a fresh interest in Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, strengthened the position of New Left ideas in the political and cultural debate as a whole. Towards the end of the decade the ideological initiative had definitely swung over to the New Left\textsuperscript{16}.

But, as we noticed already in the Introduction, when it came to make decisions on the direction and contents of Swedish cultural policy in 1974, it was to centre round the narrow, aesthetically grounded concept of culture, with the addition of two important areas; cultural heritage and radio & TV, respectively. This new policy document
determined the political domain called cultural policy, to be administered by The National Council for Cultural Affairs, erected 1974.

There was a more or less total consensus among the political parties when the decision was taken. No opposition was heard in Parliament. And I think was rather clearly reflected in the formulation of the goals. They were all rather general and abstract, and everyone agreed that culture was a serious and important matter. But the government or the politicians should not interfere with the activities as such. Swedish cultural policy should, precisely as the French Minister of Culture André Malraux once had put it “support, but not influence”. In this respect the Swedish Cultural Policy is a nice example of the Architect Model.

But there was, actually, at least one ideological marker to be noted. That was the third sentence, which stated that an important task for the cultural policy endeavours was “to counteract the negative effects of commercialism within the cultural sector”. Here the “Zeitgeist” of the 1970s was nicely brought to light, but it is also, strictly speaking, the only example of that kind of ideological leaning. As for the rest, the programme was quite neutral, which is attested to by the fact that it was unanimously adopted in the parliament.

After that – the debate died down. The fourth period of the discourse was considerably less intensive. The political parties showed rather scant interest in this area. A couple of the political parties engaged in writing new programmes on their cultural policy, but others did not bother. The Swedish Rightist Party (Moderaterna), for example, officially still holds on to a programme from 1969! This does not mean, however, that they do not have any new ideas on cultural policy issues. In reality the party publishes voluminous private bills in parliament every third or fourth year or so. But the matter obviously lacks the kind of dignity required for it to warrant treatment at a party congress.

Public debate was not very intensive either. It seems as though people were rather happy with how the system worked. For instance, when different political magazines wanted to raise the question of Swedish cultural policy, they had to edit special thematic issues with appointed discussants in order to drum up any interest at all.

The programme survived the 1980s, a decade that saw a lot of changes and turnarounds when it came to general ideological debate, economic policy and so on. But in the beginning of the 1990s the need for a new programme was felt. A new official investigation was called for in 1993. The initiative was taken by the administrative system, rather than by artists and cultural workers themselves. In this respect the 1993 investigation was clearly different from the former one, which was partly initiated and almost totally carried through by artists and intellectuals.

The result was published in 1995 and did not cause much of a public debate. However, the procedure within Parliament revealed a lot more discord among the politicians and between them and the bureaucrats than in the 1970s. The first draft had skipped several of the 1974 formulations, among them the one stating the negative approach to commercialism. But, to make a pretty complicated story short and simple; the parliamentary discussions ended with a compromise, looking, as we have seen, very much the same as in 1974. In December 1996 the decision was taken.

So, here we are, cultural policy formulations have remained more or less the same. This situation obtains despite several changes and transformations that have taken place around the world, despite the demise of the Folkhem, and despite the general adoption of a market-oriented political line on the part of the Social Democrats, including a neo-liberal economic policy and an entry into the European Union.
The most salient example is of course the prevalence of the formulation "the negative effects of commercialism". To be sure, the accent on this point has diminished, now being the consequence of the promotion of cultural diversity and artistic renewal and quality, rather than the main objective. But it is still there, and it was taken back at the initiative of the social democratic government in an act of compromising with an old partner; the peasants’ party, now called the Centre Party.

It is only one point that definitely bears vestiges of all the changes in society between 1974 and 1996. This is the last part of the very last point of the document; to promote "meetings between different cultures within Sweden". Here we can trace the fundamental transformation of Swedish society during these years; from an almost monolingual and mono-cultural nation to one that harbours a population of which some 15% are non-natives, i.e., they are born outside Sweden.

The Influence of the Folkhem Discourse

But the main feature is firm continuity, how are we to understand that? There are, of course, many different things to consider, but I think that one important factor is the initial period of the formation of the Folkhem in the 1930s. We noted the distinct shift of the Social Democrats, going from a class party to a people’s party. The change from a 'classist' emphasis in their ideology to a more nationalist strain of ideas is of great importance. This was one of the most significant markers of the whole notion of Folkhem and the ideology behind it. The delimitations of the ideological and political discourse were, as we saw, firmly set by this strategic move. The combination of the national perspective and the popular perspective excluded potential alternative positions.

Although it was faint and sporadic, there existed, as I could show, during the first three decades of the 20th century a debate about a 'workers' culture' that was hard to terminate. This idea functioned as a kind of a potentially competitive concept, around which it would, perhaps, have been possible to build another cultural policy strategy. For example, the Swedish Communists, together with non-organized workers and artists, actually tried during this period to pursue the idea of a specific and separate workers’ culture. This was done by special shows touring around the country, the playing vaudeville theatres at local stages, and other initiatives.

But this door was shut, from the 1930s on. Translated into a discourse-theoretical terminology, it is clear that the hegemonic Folkhem discourse generated a strong discursive logic. It excluded rival ideological positions that tried to articulate other experiences than those which were included in the mainstream discourse. An equivalent chain was shaped where ‘culture’, for example, was interpreted as being the conventional cultural heritage of bourgeois high culture.

As I pointed out earlier in the paper, it was exactly around these years that Per Albin Hansson, the Swedish Prime Minister and the leading Folkhem ideologue, had explicitly declared the Communists to be "non-Swedish". They belonged to a tribe that listened to foreign masters and ought to be vigorously expelled from any kind of political or ideological influence on the Swedish workers. The measures taken by the Social Democrats were, as a matter of fact, not at all merely discursive. Communist militants were effectively thrown out from the top ranks of the labour union movement.

In short, the discursive logic, coupled with political and even physical measures, shut the door to any alternative idea of culture. And this door has, with a brief exception for a few
years during the 1970s, continued to be shut since then. Any debate trying to visualize an alternative concept of culture as a potential starting point for cultural policy was efficiently marginalised already in the 1930s. (As were, of course, all attempts to materialize the concept.)

So, when the cultural policy is to be formed in the 1960s, there is, simply, only one concept of culture to build a strategy around; the conventional notion of bourgeois high culture. What else was there to manage and administer? Consequently, as was shown above, the political consensus was deeply rooted and everyone could agree on the contents and direction expressed in the policy goals of 1974, which were nicely continued in the decision from 1996.

And this logic is still, I think, very much in action. Swedish cultural policy seems to be lagging behind in a peculiar manner, and apparently lack the proper instruments with which to deal with the new situation. If you look around at the debate and research on cultural policy in the international arena, it is quite striking that while Sweden in this aspect to a large extent still is under the Folkhem-umbrella, in other countries many have moved on to a kind of post-communist situation.

The "economic" argument around cultural policy seems to have a much greater impact in e.g. Australia, England or Austria than in Sweden. Just a quick look in the latest issues of International Journal of Cultural Policy reveals quite a few articles dealing with issues like how the economists and marketers captured the arts policy, or the character and impact of the new phenomenon of "cultural entrepreneurialism". This latter concept seems to fit very well into the transformation of modern society to the Schumpeterian Workfare Regime, referred to above. In this state, it would be most desirable for us all to become entrepreneurs.

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**Notes**

1. Proposition (Government bill) 1974:28, p. 295,. My translation, AF.
2. Website of the Ministry of Culture; http://www.culture.ministry.se/inenglish/goals.htm, 040328.S
6. In Tiden, the theoretical magazine of the SAP, I have found one (!) article dealing with the idea of "workers' culture". It is from 1914. Around 1920 some Swedish Communists reported on the Proletkult-movement in the Soviet Union, trying to transplant the idea to the Swedish context.
15. A good proponent for this position was the young liberal Per Gahrton. See his article “Vilket värde har kulturen?” ("What is culture worth?") in KvällsPosten 5/6 1967.

References