# Is the Cost Disease Contagious? Or How to Complement Baumol's Model The Case of French Ancient Music Ensembles

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#### Abstract

This paper aims at completing traditional explanations of the origins of the deficit of performing arts institutions. Based on the study of early music revival in France, it shows that the usual ways to explain the transmission of "costs disease" are not sufficient. A model is proposed to complement Baumol's law, combining two hypothesis: the growing deficit of music ensembles follows their professionalization; their deficit is explained by their embeddedness in two markets (musicians' labour market and the market for concerts) in which they have to face competition with subsidized institutions.

#### Keywords

Ancient music, performing art institutions, deficit, labour market, concerts market.

## Introduction

Since Baumol and Bowen's seminal work (Baumol, Bowen, 1966), the origins of performing arts institutions' deficit has bee a major concern in cultural economics: why is that institutions dedicated to performing arts cannot sustain a balanced development? I propose here a discussion of this matter based on the case of the ancient music revival in France. Since the late seventies, the interpretation of ancient music has tremendously evolved: a long forgotten repertory has been rediscovered, and its interpretation has been following musicological canons hitherto neglected – the use of ancient instruments, the reference to ancient treatises on musical interpretation. This shift in musical conventions has led to the emergence of a whole new art world. In this emergence, ensembles rapidly grew professional. This professionalization has one paradoxical consequence: the more embedded ensembles were in the markets of musicians and concerts, the more their deficits increased. When the ensembles of ancient music work under amateurish conditions, they succeed in keeping a balanced budget. When they develop and become professionalized, their deficit grows. Their development forces them to finance this deficit through private or public subsidies<sup>1</sup>; when they do not succeed in this task, they disappear. The following table shows that none of the main ancient music ensembles can self-finance its activities and every ensemble needs subsidies to survive:

Resources of ancient music ensembles: public subsidies, patronage and self-financing – 1999.

	Subsidies	Patronage	Self-financing
Arts Florissants	18,2%	10,9%	70,9%
Chapelle Royale	42,4%	0,0%	57,6%
Ensemble Baroque de Limoges	45,7%	0,0%	54,3%
Talents Lyriques	7,8%	21,9%	70,3%
Seminario Musicale	20,0%	10,0%	70,0%
Musiciens du Louvre – Grenoble	38,9%	0,0%	61,1%
Concert Spirituel	50,0%	11,1%	38,9%

These ensembles are the main french early music ensembles. Sources : interviews with administrators

Public subsidies constitute an average of 32% of the budget of ancient music ensembles while the merchant resources contribute to 61% of their budget. Even if this proportion is very high for performing art institutions, the ancient music revival is a quasi-experimental case to understand the origins of performing arts institutions deficit. By following step by step the ensembles' path, one can understood the way their deficit grew. My findings result from a survey I carried out between 1996 and 2000, interviews with actors of the ancient music world, archival statistics and ethnographical observations, all part of a larger project aimed at explaining the early music revival<sup>2</sup>.

I will review the main models that try to explain the cost disease (*i.e.*, the unavoidable deficit of performing art institutions), and test them in the case of ancient music ensembles. I will show that these models alone cannot explain the development of deficits. I will then propose a new model complementing baumol's model, in order to specify the way cost disease is transmitted to ancient music ensembles.

## Baumol's Law and Ancient Music

W.J Baumol and W.G. Bowen proposed the first attempt to explain the "cost disease" that seems to accur in performing art institutions (Baumol and Bowen, 1966). Their macroeconomic model is based on long-term dynamics. They distinguish two sectors in the economy, a productive one (A) where productivity grows with time, and a non-productive one (B) where productivity is stable. Deficits of performing arts institutions are explained by the differences in the evolution of productivity in the progressive sector (*e.g.*, manufacturing industries) and in the performing arts sector. Wages level in performing arts institutions depend on wage levels in the progressive sector. As there is no growth of productivity in performing arts institutions get higher and higher over time.

This model shows that the growing deficits of performing art institutions are not generated by bad management, but are a mechanical consequence of the gap of productivity between these two macroeconomic sectors. It has unsurprinsingly been quite popular inside the corporation of cultural managers, since it helped them justify the situation of their institutions (Palma, 1990). But one must be cautious with an uncontrolled generalization of Baumol's law to explain the deficit of every performing art institutions. The empirical demonstrations of Baumol and Bowen's model are based on long-term series (see for instance, Baumol et Bowen (1966), Blaug (1976), Leroy

(1980)): the mechanisms they identify as explanatory for this "cost disease" (the unavoidable deficit of performing arts institutions) operates only over long periods. They do not work in short or medium terms: to create a hugh deficit, the gap between the wage growth and the stagnation of productivity requires more than a few months or even a few years. In the case of ancient music ensembles, deficits grew in less than five years. In such a short period, no productivity gap can be found. To explain the growing deficit of ancient music ensembles, one must – at least temporarily – give up Baumol's model and try to find another explanation.

## Are Deficits a Strategy?

The limits of Baumol's model I have just suggested are not specific to ancient music. This model has generated a lot of literature, including papers that tried to shift its general perspective, such as works influenced by the school of the public choice (Buchanan, 1968; Tullock, 1978). They no longer work at the macroeconomic level, but in a microeconomic perspective; and they do not consider that the deficit is the result of the mechanical disjunction between two rates of productivity, but that it is the consequences of deliberate strategies. These models are based on two hypothesis linked to loose control: first, the consumer pays only a part of the price of the service he buys; his or her control will therefore be weaker than if he had paid the real cost; and, second, the trustees of susbidized performing art institutions lack information to really control these institutions, that have a monopoly of information on their costs. This lack of control allows managers to have at their disposal a discretionary budget. This budget can be used for three purposes: it can help to increase production (strategy of overquantity), it can be used to improve the quality of the shows (strategy of overguality), or it can be used to pay more generously the production factors (Grampp, 1989; Dupuis, 1983; Frey and Pommerehne, 1993).

A part of the deficit of ancient music ensembles can also be explained by strategies followed by administrators of these institutions. Three types of conduct can be identified, that recall the behaviour when discussing the managers' strategies. The first one can barely be called a strategy: it corresponds to the situation where ensembles work in such an amateurish way that their administrators lack the necessary abilities to manage the development of their ensembles. Administrators of ancient music ensembles did invent a new job: their activities had no equivalent in the musical world before they appeared. Their on-the-job training includes mistakes, and some of these mistakes sometimes cause the death of the institution they were in charge of, or at least putting it in great danger. One example can be found in the case of *Les Arts Florissants*, one of the most famous ensembles that grew rapidly in the beginning of the eighties – one of his late administrators explains:

"In the beginning, there were small misses, but they finally generate big ones. There had been a deficit on *Medee* by Charpentier – on the record, essentially. (...) After that, the deficit generated its own deficit: as they had to pay the artists and the supplier, they did not pay taxes, so they had penalties, etc. It was under the administration of A. – who was not entirely responsible for all this – and they pushed her to exit when she was pregnant for the second time. Christie then put on the stage someone who was at the time his private secretary, B., who had lots of qualities but who had not learned this job. He committed serious mistakes: for examples, he calculated a balanced budget, but he forgot sales taxes – he followed his budget and in the end, of course, he was loosing money. He was a very good guy, but he did not know this trade. From the moment he arrived, it went worse and worse with at an exponential speed: he was in charge of business since the end of 85 approximately, and they called me for help in the end of 86.

My first job has been to calculate the deficit. No one had the slightest idea: I arrived September 1<sup>st</sup>1986, they had not done their 1985 accounts" (Interview, 15 June 1999)<sup>3</sup>.

The growth of the deficit can also result form a deliberate strategy of the ensembles to obtain subsidies of public collectivities, that will not help them if they can survive on their own, but will promptly interfere to prevent the ensemble's death. This strategy consists of adopting an unbalanced enough budget to make the intervention desirable or necessary, without being accused of bad management - the bet is risky, as this administrator puts it:

"The aim was to play with all this so that, in the end of year, we could present to our board – on which there were some representatives of the *direction de la musique* – a balanced budget, or even one with a slight deficit, so that they would increase our subsidy the next year. Without going as far as what is said about the army, "making the trucks run to use the petrol", we wanted to be able to say: Look, we would like to have 100 or 200,000 francs more next year" (Interview, 25 June 1999)<sup>4</sup>.

Up to now, I only described strategies that can be avoided by ensembles if they decide to. The last one is more imperative. Ancient music ensembles have to anticipate their resources if they want to be engaged by concerts producers. The planning of an ensemble is defined several years in advance. To make their engagement easier, they often have to make their prices lower: they accept to invest in the production and to assume part of its costs. But when they accept to invest, they ignore how much money they will have at their disposal when the production will occur. Most of the time, the amount of subsidies they get is decided every year by the state or the city that supports them, and this sum can change every year. So they have to make a bet: to be able to work tomorrow, they have to bet today on the amount of money they will have tomorrow. The strategy of deficit is not only a choice, it is also the consequence of the gap between the moment the ensembles have to take decisions about their productions and the moment they know what their real resources are.

But if this temporal gap plays a role in the development of the deficit of ancient music ensembles, the explanation it provides is not sufficient. It cannot explain, in particular, the fact that this deficit *always* appears: even if the administrators are very capable ones, even if the strategies are reasonable, and even if the resources can be anticipated. How can we explain this necessity?

## The Professionalization Model

To explain how the cost disease is transmitted to ancient music ensembles, one needs to consider two main aspects. The first one deals with the fact that ensembles are embedded in two markets: the musician labour market, and the market for concerts. In both of these markets, ensembles have to be competitive. The second aspect is linked to the professionalization process: as long as they remain amateur, they can keep their finances balanced; but as they become professionalized, they have to accept a deficit. Let us first recall how a concert of ancient music is produced. The ensemble decides to sell a programme ; it hires musicians and make them rehearse ; it sells the concerts to theatres, festivals, etc.. The selling price of the concert includes the concert cost and a part of the cost of the rehearsals.

When ensembles are amateur, they do not pay their musicians. Thus, they can propose concerts on the market at very low prices. As they get professionalized, they have to face competition on both markets. On the musicians' labour market, they have to offer wages that can be competitive with those proposed by other orchestras; as these orchestras are subsidized by the state, they can pay very well their musicians. If, while raising their wages, ancient music ensembles could raise their prices on the market for concerts, they would still be able to balance their budget. But as they compete with subsidized institutions, they have to keep their prices low, which leads them to run a deficit. As long as they were amateur, ancient music ensembles could face competition without any subsidy. When becoming professional, they have to accept a deficit to be competitive on both markets. The dynamics of professionalization allows the ensembles to get into both markets without subsidies; to be able to stay in those markets, they need to be competitive with subsidized institutions: Their survival is linked to the acceptance – and the management – of a deficit. The mechanisms that explain how the cost disease is transmitted are not those Baumol and Bowen identified: They are explained by the market mechanism and the competitive game.

One can try to model this argument<sup>5</sup>. The model I propose below concerns the deficit for a single concert; to obtain the global deficit for one year, one could sum the deficit of each concert. It is assumed that the subsidies the ensemble receives covers the cost of its administration, and cannot help in lowering the prices of the production.

To finance a concert, an ensemble has two resources: the price of the concert and the deficit.

(I) 
$$C_1 = P_1 + D_1$$

Where

 $P_1$  = price of the concert;  $D_1$  = deficit generated by the concert;  $C_1$  = cost of the concert.

It is assumed that the cost of the concert can be approximated by the wage cost. This wage cost can be separated in two parts: the cost of the concert strictly speaking, which corresponds to the amount of the fees paid to each musician for his specific work the night of the concert; and the share of the cost of the rehearsals which is financed in the concert price. To prepare a concert, the musicians need to rehearse; musicians get paid for these rehearsals. The fee paid for a rehearsal is generally the same as the one paid for a concert. The cost of the rehearsals is divided among all the concerts organizers who buy it. If the ensemble only sells its concert swice, the cost of the rehearsal will be divided among these two buyers; if the concert is sold ten times, the cost will be divided by ten.

$$C_1 = L_1 W_1 + a_1 L_1 W_1$$
  
(II)  $C_1 = L_1 W_1 (1+a_1)$ 

Where

 $L_1$  = number of musicians.

 $W_1 = fee.$ 

 $a_1 = r_1/c_1$  where  $r_1 =$  number of rehearsal fees;

and  $c_1$  = number of concerts in the tour.

and

So (I) becomes

$$P_1 + D_1 = L_1 W_1 (1+a_1)$$

(III) 
$$P_1 = L_1 W_1 (1+a_1) - D_1 - 5 -$$

The ancient music ensembles will try to sell their concerts for a price  $P_1$ . This price has to be competitive with the price asked by orchestras that receive subsidies. We assume that for these orchestras subsidies cover a part  $\beta$  of their artistic cost. In their case, the price of the concert must finance a part  $1-\beta = \alpha$  of the wage cost of the concert. What is this cost? These orchestras employ full time musicians, who in exchange of the salary are required to work a certain amount of hours for the orchestra. To make a comparison between these orchestras and the ancient music ensembles easier, I will define here  $W_2$  the amount of money a salaried musician received for *one* concert or *one* rehearsal. One can then define the price of a concert by a traditional orchestra:

(IV) 
$$P_2 = \alpha L_2 W_2 (1 + a_2)$$

Where

 $\alpha = 1 - \beta$ With  $\beta$  = level of subsidies of the traditional orchestra. P<sub>2</sub> = price of the concert of the traditional orchestra; L<sub>2</sub> = number of musicians; W<sub>2</sub> = amount of money received for a concert; a<sub>2</sub> = r<sub>2</sub>/c<sub>2</sub> with r<sub>2</sub> = number of rehearsals ; c<sub>2</sub> = number of concerts.

It is assumed that orchestras must be competitive on two markets: the concert market and the labour market. The wages offered by ancient music ensembles must be equal to the wages offered by traditional orchestras:

$$(V) W_1 = W_2 = W$$

The concert prices asked by ancient music ensembles must be equal to the prices asked by traditional orchestras:

(VI) 
$$P_1 = P_2 = P$$

These two hypotheses specify the deficit level of ancient music ensembles. From (VI), it comes

$$L_1W_1(1+a_1) - D_1 = \alpha L_2W_2(1+a_2)$$

or

$$D_1 = L_1 W_1 (1+a_1) - \alpha L_2 W_2 (1+a_2)$$

If one takes (V) into account, it becomes :

(VII) 
$$D_1 = W [ L_1 (1+a_1) - \alpha L_2 (1+a_2) ]$$

Under what conditions is  $D_1 = 0$ ? To discuss this point, one has to consider separately competition on the labour market and competition on the market for concerts. From (VII), one clearly sees the deficit is equal to zero if no wages are paid to musicians. This is the case when ensembles work as amateur. When they get professionalized, the ensembles must give some remuneration if they want to attract good musicians. The mechanism of transmission of the cost disease is a mechanism of indexing, but not between a productive sector and a non-productive one as in Baumol's model. The indexing here

concerns two segments of the same labour market : the competition between subsidized institutions and institutions that get no subsidy is here the main mechanism.

But if the ensembles had only to be competitive on the labour market, they could develop without seeing their deficit grow. It is because they have to be competitive, at the same time, on the market for concerts that they have to accept a deficit. To explain this point, one must distinguish two cases : when the traditional orchestra is on tour and when it is settled in a single city.

When the traditional orchestra is on tour, one can consider that the number of concerts given for a single programme is the same for the ancient music ensembles and for the orchestras. Both will rehearse three days, for example, and will then give twelve concerts. In other words,  $a_1 = a_2$ . In this case,  $D_1 = 0$  if

(VIII) 
$$L_1 (1 + a_1) = \alpha L_2 (1 + a_2)$$

or if

$$L_1 = \alpha L_2$$

1. When the subsidized orchestra is on tour, the non-subsidized one must sell smaller production for the same price if it wants to avoid deficit. In Europe and in the United-States, the level of subsidy is around 80% of the budget of an orchestra ( $\alpha = 20\%$ ). Under these conditions, the ancient music ensemble must sell for the same price its concert, while employing only 20% of the labour compared to permanent orchestras. It sometimes happens, when the reputation of the ancient music ensemble is strong enough, that buyers are willing to pay an equal price for only 20% of the labour. Most of the time, however, producers refuse to buy a chamber music concert for the price of a symphony orchestra. Moreover, artistic directors want to develop their career by playing programmes requiring more and more musicians. Under these conditions, the ancient music ensembles cannot balance their budget by acting upon the size effect. Once again, we see that the mechanisms of transmission of the cost disease are linked to the competition between subsidized orchestras and outsiders trying to enter the market.

2. Most of the time in Europe – and especially in France – traditional orchestras are settled in a city. These orchestras are subsidized to develop at musical offering in a single place, where they have to play every week a new programme. In other words, when not on tour, they have to renew their programmes much more often. Usually, traditional orchestras rehearse a programme and play it twice in concerts; when ancient music ensembles play the same programme between six and twelve times, depending on the programme and on their reputation. When an ancient music ensemble is in competition with a traditional orchestra, how can its deficit be equal to zero? Once again, we will have to distinguish between two cases, whether the orchestra and the ensemble employ the same number of musicians, or if they are not of the same size.

i) **Ensemble and orchestras of the same size**. In this case, let us recall that D<sub>1</sub>=0 if

(VIII) 
$$L_1 (1 + a_1) = \alpha L_2 (1 + a_2)$$

If the orchestra and the ensemble have to be of the same size, in other words if  $L_1 = L_2$ , then (VIII) becomes :

$$1 + a_1 = \alpha \left( 1 + a_2 \right)$$

or 
$$\alpha = \ (1+a_1) \ / \ (1+a_2)$$
 or 
$$\beta = \ 1 - \left[ (1+a_1) \ / \ (1+a_2) \right]$$

In this case, the ensemble will have a deficit as soon as

$$\begin{array}{c} \alpha < \ (1+a_1) \, / \, (1+a_2) \\ \text{Or if} \\ \beta > \ 1 - \left[ (1+a_1) \, / \, (1+a_2) \right] \\ \text{Or} \\ \beta > \left[ r \, (c_1-c_2) \right] \, / \left[ c_1 \, (c_2+r) \right] \end{array}$$

From this point, we can show that the deficit of the ancient music ensemble necessarily grows with its professionalization. It actually has no way to play on the level of subsidies that the traditional orchestra receive ( $\beta$ ) nor on its selling strategy ( $a_2$ ). We assumed here that it could not play on the size of its production either. It only has two variables it can adjust, namely : the number of rehearsal and the number of concerts (both influencing the value of  $(a_1)$ . When ensembles try to leave amateurism, they have no way to play on these variables. To become professionals, they have to improve their quality as a group, and then they have to rehearse a lot - no matter the number of concerts they sell. The movement from amateurism to professionalism implies first an increase of a<sub>1</sub>, and of their deficit. Once they have passed through this stage, two strategies emerge. The first one is *commercial*. In this case, the ensemble tries to be price-competitive. It will try to diminish the number of rehearsals; this will immediately lower the value of  $a_1$ . After a while, however, its quality will not be constant, the ensemble will sell less and less concerts and  $a_1$  will increase once again. The second strategy consists of being competitive on *quality*. In this strategy, the ensemble rehearses a lot to improve the quality of its concerts. At the beginning,  $a_1$  will rise up and the deficit will grow. But after a while, once the reputation of the ensemble has been established, it will be able to increase the number of concerts for each programme – and so a<sub>1</sub> will decrease and deficit will be contained. If the deficit necessarily grows with the professionalization of the ancient music ensemble, the long-term success of the ensemble is a way to control it.

#### ii) Ensembles and orchestras of different sizes. We know that D<sub>1</sub>=0 if

(VIII) 
$$L_1 (1 + a_1) = \alpha L_2 (1 + a_2)$$

We now suppose that a buyer will accept to pay the same price for production of different sizes, wether the productions are sold by an ancient music ensemble or by a traditional orchestra. What must the ratio of the size of the productions be to make the deficit of an ancient music ensemble equals to zero? From (VIII), it comes that :

$$L_1 / L_2 = \alpha [(1 + a_2) / (1 + a_1)]$$

Let us now proceed to some simulations. The level of subsidies of traditional orchestras is around 80%. Under these conditions, an ancient music ensemble that succeeds in selling its concert twelve times will be have to propose, for the same price, a concert with only 53% of the number of musicians proposed by the traditional orchestra ; if it sells the concert six times, the ratio will be of 40%. I have argued above that most of the times, the conditions that would allow an ensemble to sell their productions this way are not fulfilled. Therefore, ensembles will see their deficit grow if they want to survive.

## Conclusion

The professionalization of ancient music ensembles implies that they cannot anymore play, once they become professionals, with the two variables that allowed them to enter the market when they were amateurs: the wage they offer to the musicians they employ and the price they can sell their concerts. The model I have proposed here supposes that in order to be be competitive with subsidized institutions, ensembles can only play with two other variables: the production size and the ratio number of rehearsals / number of concerts. The professionalization of ensembles makes them make inappropriate choices with regard to containing their deficit, but appropriate choices with regards to competition. Buyers seldom accept to pay the same price for a chamber music ensemble and a symphonic orchestra ; the artistic director's career dynamics usually pushes them to program bigger and bigger productions. Concerning the ratio rehearsals / concerts, they also lack possibilities. If they decrease the number of rehearsals, they simultaneously lower the quality of their productions. And they hardly find a large enough number of buyers to pay for their productions: twelve times is a maximum. This model of professionalization could be generalized to other performing art worlds where new entrants with no subsidies try to compete with subsidized insiders on two markets at the time. As long as they are amateurs, they can survive; but if they succeed and become professionals, they have to run a deficit.

To explain the origins of the deficit, Baumol's model alone is not sufficient. The mechanisms he describes (indexing of the salaries of the non-productive sector on the salaries of the productive one) and the primum movens he identifies (a gap of productivity) do not actually play the role he assumes they play. The mechanisms of transmission are those I identify: they come from the simultaneous competition on the market for concerts and on the labour market. It is not a long-term gap of productivity that provokes an increase in the deficit; it is a short-term gap of subsidies between two segments of the same markets, the insider institutions and the outsiders. This model is not a substitute to Baumol's argument, but a complement: it explains how the cost disease is transmitted to new entrants; but the question of the origins of this disease is still at stake: why do insider institutions have a deficit? To answer this question, Baumol's model is fully relevant : there is no link between the musicians' productivity, which is stable, and the level of skills, which is very high and has to be paid for. In other words, there are two mechanisms that explain the level of financial balance of performing art institutions: the new entrants index their prices and the wages they offer on those of insider institutions; and, at the same time, those institutions have their financial balance modified on the long run, by the gap that grows between the productive sector and the non-productive one. Two mechanisms of balance definition (productive / non-productive sector; new entrants / insiders) correspond to two scales of reasoning (macroeconomic / microeconomic) and to two temporal horizons (long-term / short term) in defining the economic dynamics of performing art institutions.

## Notes

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In this paper, I will assume that the level of deficit equals the level of non-merchant resources. I will later discuss whether subsidies create deficit, or if they follow it.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The main results of this research are presented in François (2004).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> « Au départ, c'étaient des petits dérapages, mais ils avaient fini par en faire des gros. Il y avait eu un déficit sur Médée de Charpentier – sur le disque essentiellement. Ils ne sont jamais rentrés dans leurs frais, et ils ont dû quand même en assumer la charge. Ensuite, le déficit a fabriqué son propre déficit : comme il fallait bien payer les artistes et les fournisseurs, on ne payait pas l'URSAFF, donc il y avait des pénalités, etc. C'était sous l'administration de A. –

qui n'était pas entièrement responsable de tout ça, d'ailleurs – et ils l'ont poussée vers la sortie au moment de sa deuxième grossesse ; Christie a alors mis en scène quelqu'un qui était à cette époque là son secrétaire personnel, B., qui avait des tas de qualité mais qui n'avait pas appris ce métier. Il commettait des erreurs graves : il faisait un budget équilibré, mais il avait oublié la TVA – il suivait son budget et à la fin, évidemment, il perdait de l'argent. C'était quelqu'un de très bien, mais il ne savait pas. A partir du moment où il est arrivé, ça a empiré à une vitesse exponentielle : il a d'ailleurs été en charge des affaires fin 85 à peu près, et ils m'ont appelé au secours fin 86. Mon premier boulot a été de chiffrer le déficit, dont personne n'avait la moindre idée : je suis arrivé le 1<sup>er</sup> septembre 86, ils n'avaient pas encore sorti les comptes 85. » (Interview, 15 June 1999).

- <sup>4</sup> « Le but était de jouer avec tout ça pour, à la fin de l'année, présenter au conseil d'administration – dans lequel il y avait des représentants de la direction à la musique, d'ailleurs – un budget en équilibre, voire en léger déficit, de telle façon qu'ils nous augmentent notre subvention l'année suivante. Sans aller jusqu'à faire ce qu'on raconte sur l'armée, faire tourner les camions pour user l'essence, on voulait pouvoir dire : voilà, on aimerait bien 100 ou 200 000 francs de plus l'an prochain, pour le fonctionnement.» (Interview, 25 June 1999).
- <sup>5</sup> The model I propose here is very simple; it is only a schematisation of my empirical findings. It helps identify the crucial variables on which ensembles can act upon, and clarifies the competition between orchestras and ensembles.

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