

# Handbook of Insurance

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Edited by

Georges Dionne  
Risk Management Chair  
HEC-Montreal

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# **Handbook of Insurance**

## **Contributing authors**

Pierre-André Chiappori  
*University of Chicago, USA*  
*pchiappo@midway.uchicago.edu*

Keith J. Crocker  
*University of Michigan, USA*  
*kcrocker@umich.edu*

J. David Cummins  
*University of Pennsylvania, USA*  
*cummins@wharton.upenn.edu*

Patricia Danzon  
*University of Pennsylvania, USA*  
*danzon@wharton.upenn.edu*

Georges Dionne  
*École des Hautes Études Commerciales,  
Canada*  
*georges.dionne@hec.ca*

Neil Doherty  
*University of Pennsylvania, USA*  
*doherty@wharton.upenn.edu*

Louis Eeckhoudt  
*Faculté Universitaire Catholique de Mons,  
Belgium*  
*eeckhoudt@message.fucam.ac.be*

Nathalie Fombaron  
*Université de Paris X-Nanterre, France*  
*nathalie.fombaron@u-paris10.fr*

Bernard Fortin  
*Université Laval, Canada*  
*bfor@ecn.ulaval.ca*

James Garven  
*Louisiana State University, USA*  
*jim@garven.com*

Christian Gollier  
*Université de Toulouse I, France*  
*gollier@cict.fr*

Tarek M. Harchaoui  
*Statistique Canada, Canada*  
*harctar@statcan.ca*

Scott Harrington  
*University of South Carolina,  
USA*  
*scottnet@darla.badm.sc.edu*

Howard Kunreuther  
*University of Pennsylvania, USA*  
*kunreuther@wharton.upenn.edu*

Paul Lanoie  
*École des Hautes Études Commerciales,  
Canada*  
*paul.lanoie@hec.ca*

Henri Loubergé  
*Université de Genève, Switzerland*  
*henri.louberge@ecopo.unige.ch*

Mark J. Machina  
*University of California, San Diego, USA*  
*mmachina@weber.ucsd.edu*

Richard MacMinn  
*University of Texas, USA*  
*macminn@mail.utexas.edu*

David Mayers  
*University of California, Riverside, USA*  
*david.mayers@ucr.edu*

Olivia S. Mitchell  
*University of Pennsylvania, USA*  
*mitchelo@wharton.upenn.edu*

Greg Niehaus  
*University of South Carolina*  
gregn@darla.badm.sc.edu

Jean-François Outreville  
*Office des Nations Unies, Switzerland*  
joutreville@unog.ch

Richard D. Phillips  
*Georgia State University, USA*  
rphillips@gsu.edu  
Pierre Picard  
*Université de Paris-X Nanterre, France*  
pierre.picard@u-paris10.fr

Jean Pinquet  
*Université de Paris-X Nanterre, France*  
pinquet@u-paris10.fr

Laureen Regan  
*Temple University, USA*  
lregan@thunder.ocis.temple.edu

Harris Schlesinger  
*University of Alabama, USA*  
hschlesi@cba.ua.edu

Clifford W. Smith  
*University of Rochester, USA*  
smith@simon.rochester.edu

Stephen D. Smith  
*Georgia State University, USA*  
sdsmith@gsu.edu

Arthur Snow  
*University of Georgia, USA*  
snow@rigel.econ.uga.edu

Sharon Tennyson  
*Cornell University, USA*  
st96@cornell.edu

Bertrand Villeneuve  
*Université de Toulouse 1, France*  
villeneu@cict.fr

Mary A. Weiss  
*Temple University, USA*  
mweiss@thunder.temple.edu

Ralph Winter  
*University of Toronto, Canada*  
rwinter@chass.utoronto.ca

Peter Zweifel  
*Zurich University, Switzerland*  
pzweifel@sozoc.unizh.ch

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