Life-cycle Analysis and Change by Design: Applying Business Process Re-engineering in the Performing Arts

Clarence S. Bayne
Professor, Decision Sciences/MIS
Director, Graduate Diploma in Administration,
John Molson School of Business, Concordia University

Clarence Bayne (Ph.D., Economics, McGill University) has authored and co-authored numerous scholarly publications as well as many reports and briefs to government bodies on multi-culturalism and educational issues and on social cohesion.

Abstract
All organizations have life cycles analogous to human beings: birth, infancy, youthful exploration, midlife, maturity and decay/death. Unlike the cycles in the lives of humans, the causes of life cycles are not inherent to the aging process, but depend on the capacity of leadership to re-invent the organization when needed. This capacity and capability are limited by knowledge and personality traits. The decisions a leader makes for an organization may be strongly influenced by her own psychological needs rather than the strategic responses needed by the organization to adjust to its changing environment. Non-optimal decisions weaken the competitive position or social value of the organization and shorten its life. This is independent of scale. We propose that what the organization needs is a man for all seasons (a synergist) or an organizational culture that can simulate a synergistic style. To explore these propositions, we compared the performance of the Black Theatre Workshop of Montreal (BTW) over 34 years with the performances of similar cultural companies in Toronto. The research question is: Why has BTW survived whereas they have failed? The major contributing factor seems to be BTW’s rejection of autocracy centered either in the artistic function or the administrative function. The choice of a synergistic style supported by a participatory management system has enabled the organization to be more flexible in its approach to problem familiarization and the search for solutions. This is perhaps why the organization has been able to restructure itself several times in its 34 years to deal successfully with internal and external crises.

Keywords
Organizational life-cycles, business process re-engineering, participatory management, leadership styles, Black theatre.

Over the last 60 years, the quality management movement has provided managers with a variety of quality approaches to management: TQM, CQM, the learning organization, process engineering, business re-engineering. These were aimed at improving the competitive position of the organization in the market, by increasing their efficiency and effectiveness; improving quality and customer relationships and reversing the decay of the organization by re-inventing it. These models and concepts had their origins in large organizational structures and were tested there. While it is often assumed that these models can be successfully adapted to small-scale organizations, very few cases or studies exist that examine the successful application of process re-engineering or TQM/CQM models to small-scale enterprises and organizations (McAdam, 2000).

Small businesses and nonprofit organizations exhibit similar reasons for failure: lack of formal management training or awareness of the need for it; lack of continuous improvement planning
or a quality management philosophy, lack of resources, short-term outlook, little or no strategic planning, lack of marketing strategy and plan, lack of a business strategy, resistance to change. Nevertheless, small organizations have innate characteristics that give them significant potential for managing change and avoiding decay. These organizations can be flatter by virtue of their small size and friendlier environment. Their typically small staffs and small physical operating spaces can more easily be adapt to cross-functional decision making processes, and seamless internal communication systems (Cuffley, 2003, p. 9-10; McAdam, 2002). Because of the absence of hierarchical and departmentalized structures (silos), they are capable of more dynamic responses to change; they can be more flexible and adaptable and can more easily manage and improve customer relationships and inter-organizational relations over the various phases of the life cycle of the organization.

It is my belief that the organizational weaknesses of a small performing arts company can be corrected and the forces of decay reversed if the leadership style and employee behaviour are made to adapt to the strategic responses dictated by the changes in the environment. This will require continuous organizational performance evaluations, instilling and reinforcing the values of self-assessment at the individual and organizational levels, and the implementation of the principles of continuous improvement as part of the organizational culture (Cuffley, 2003). It is the intention of this paper to explore how business process re-engineering concepts, in association with a synergistic leadership style management, can be applied within the framework of life-cycle analysis to improve the efficiency of the small organization, realize its mission and extend its life beyond the maturity stage. A case study of the Black Theatre Workshop of Montreal (BTW) will be used to test aspects of the theory presented. BTW is a small theatre company that is funded professionally by the three levels of government in Canada. It was incorporated in 1971. Over the 34 years of its existence it has grown from a non-professional community theatre to a professional theatre company. This researcher’s access to files and documents of the organization provides a rare opportunity to observe the growth process from birth/infancy, through exploration and startup, expansion and growth, maturity, to stagnation and decline.

A Brief Perspective on Life-Cycle Theory and the Small Organization

What exactly do we mean when we say organizations go through life cycles? When we speak of the life cycle of a human being we have a fairly clear understanding of what that means: the stages of man from birth/the cradle until death/the grave. These stages are characterized by changes on the somatic and psychic levels of the being and are manifested in needs, behaviours, activities, roles, and life styles. Many researchers ascribe to the human being a life cycle of birth, youth, midlife and maturity. Our specific knowledge of the nature of the patterns of needs and the goods and services required to satisfy needs and sustain life at each stage of the life cycle makes it possible to forecast demand and plan supply (Foot and Stoffman, 1996, p. 213-238). Similarly, if we understand the nature of life cycles in organizations and what causes these cycles, then we could also take action to benefit from future outcomes or to influence them. We would be able to bring about certain types of desired futures.

Organizations acquire and allocate resources to the provision of our needs (utilitarian, hedonic and symbolic). Organizations go through life cycles because in part people go through life cycles. Organizations follow different cyclical patterns of change, partly because they are influenced by the personalities of their creators, and by the learning and decision-making models they choose in response to changes in the external environments in which the organization performs and grows. But organizations also have a life span or usefulness that
could be independent of their creators. Productive systems (organizations) are renewable. Each phase in the organizational life-cycle offers opportunity for renewal and growth or for decline or death. What is the cyclical “nature” of an organization? We may say that organizations are analogous to human beings in the sense that they are born, they go through a youth or growth period, a middle age during which they, like human beings, make more informed decisions based on a learning process, and maturity when stagnation or fatigue sets in. Economic theory describes this process in terms of the law of diminishing marginal returns and economies or diseconomies of scale.

Scale /size refers to the most efficient level of output for a given technology and endowment of productive resources. Economies of scale are associated with changes over time in the size of an organization from small to medium to large. Over this period of time the organization is hypothesized to experience rapidly increasing demand and growth in output. Initially, (after startup) the organization enters the growth and expansion stage. It becomes more efficient in its use of productive resources and costs diminish. Diseconomies of scale are associated with change from large to very large scale. During this period the organization has exhausted many of the earlier economies of scale, factor costs rise as more specialized resources are needed, and span of control and communication problems reduce efficiency. At each change in scale, the organization is threatened by short-term cycles of birth, growth, stagnation and decay partly explained by the technical principles of diminishing marginal return, but also because of rigidities in leadership personality types, lack of new ideas and innovation, and inappropriate learning and decision making systems. Changing the scale of the organization is a way of avoiding stagnation and decay in a competitive but imperfect market situation. But as the theory itself suggests, beyond a certain scale (very large size) the organization may have to be completely re-invented or re-engineered (requiring innovation and the use of new technologies, radical changes in the learning and decision-making systems, changes in leadership styles).

In my view, the comparison of an organization’s life cycle to that of a human being is more than mere analogy. For it is people who create organizations and make decisions for them. These decisions are based on a mission and a set of objectives/purposes that managers implement through a plan and procedures that they control, review and evaluate to ensure that they meet the socially desired outcomes. Table I below shows in a rather linear fashion the relationship between the growth stages of organizations (small, medium, large to very large) as analogous to the birth-to-maturity cycle of the human being. It also associates these life-cycle stages with other structural and decision-making features that tend to be characteristic of organizations at different stages of the life cycle: degree of division of labour, centralization of decision making, administrative intensity, formalized operations systems and procedures.
Table I: Organizational Life Cycles and Corresponding Typical Features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Birth</th>
<th>Youth</th>
<th>Midlife</th>
<th>Maturity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size</strong></td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>Very large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bureaucratic</strong></td>
<td>Non-bureaucratic</td>
<td>Pre-bureaucratic</td>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td>Very bureaucratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Division of Labour</strong></td>
<td>Overlapping tasks</td>
<td>Some departments</td>
<td>Many departments</td>
<td>Extensive, with small jobs and many descriptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centralization</strong></td>
<td>One-person rule</td>
<td>Two leaders rule</td>
<td>Two department</td>
<td>Top-heavy management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formalization</strong></td>
<td>No written rules</td>
<td>Few rules</td>
<td>Policy and procedures manuals</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administrative</strong></td>
<td>Secretary, no professional staff</td>
<td>Increasing clerical and maintenance</td>
<td>Increasing professional and staff support</td>
<td>Large – multiple departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal systems</strong></td>
<td>Nonexistent</td>
<td>Crude budget and information system</td>
<td>Control systems in place; budget, performance, reports, etc.</td>
<td>Extensive – planning, financial, and personnel added</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lateral teams, task forces for coordination</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Top leaders only</td>
<td>Some use of integrators and task forces</td>
<td>Frequent at lower levels to break down bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table I provides an interesting framework and insights into the relationships between human life-cycles and organizational life-cycles. But it should not be considered to have the analytic and predictive properties of a scientific model. There are important differences. While individuals can be removed or do die, organizations do not necessarily die. Also, the idiosyncratic choices of different leadership personalities can have particular negative or positive impact upon the life path followed by the organization. Strategically, leadership personalities can be changed or leaders replaced by others more suited to the management and leadership needs of the organization in transition. The organization is not static as might be suggested by the framework set out in Table I. The organization can be re-engineered so that, independent of its original creator(s), it continues to produce outcomes that are valued and for which people are willing to pay directly and indirectly. An organization can through an effective succession process and efficient and effective planning extend its life farther into the future than any human being has been known to do. Thus, contrary to what is suggested in Table I, size is not strictly associated with the chronological age of the organization or its maturity, in the human sense of its aging. The stages of the life cycle may be observed at any organizational scale/size. Organizational size may be dictated by market structure (size, degrees and type of
competitive market strategies) and environmental factors. Moreover, the type of management structure (spanning non-bureaucratic to bureaucratic) or the type of decision-making model adopted is not linearly related to the birth-maturity cycle suggested by the human life-cycle model. Moreover, it does not necessarily follow that small organizations are non-bureaucratic while large organizations are necessarily bureaucratic or more departmentalized with a top-heavy management. Small organizations, because of their small staff and small spaces, might have decision-making systems that are more likely to be less hierarchical (flatter) and more cross-functional using more top-down bottom-up decision-making processes.

A productive organization system consists of a number of sub-functions that interact in a meaningful way to achieve valued outcomes. Thus, small organizations, like large organizations, cannot avoid carrying out those management sub-functions, essential to the productive process. Therefore, it is understandable that small organizations may not be able to take advantage of certain economies of scale that can be exploited by large scale organizations: division of labour, greater flexibility in the use of productive resources, discounts on large scale purchases, and financial transactions. However, they can be as well organized and have efficient and effective planning and action plans. They can by the very nature of being small (number of staff and small office space) communicate internally more easily and effectively; and be more responsive to external market and environmental change than very large-scale organizations with systemic bureaucracy decision systems. Thus, in certain sectors where the market is very competitive, and change is continuous and volatile, small scale and medium scale organizations may do much better than large organizations in responding to or exploiting change. Therefore, it may be more appropriate to give less emphasis to size in the birth to death cycle and focus more on leadership and management styles.

Table II below is based on the assumption that there is a strong relationship between the life cycle stages of an organization and the style of its leadership. The table is a modification of a summary by Carter McNamara of the work of Lawrence Miller in his book *Barbarians to Bureaucrats: Corporate Life Cycle Strategies* (McNamara, 1999). The table suggests a framework for exploring the factors responsible for the birth and those influencing the growth and development of the organization. It highlights characteristics that tend to be most frequently present at the growth, maturity and decay stages of the life cycle. Leadership is a pivotal factor. Certain personality types posses the essential characteristics that foster organizational growth and accelerate development: the visionary/entrepreneur, the focused barbarian implementer, builders or creators, professionals and administrator-synergists. Others, such as the bureaucratic and aristocratic types, are associated with bringing about the decline of the organization. Decline comes when the organization leadership becomes more concerned with organizational form and neglects the satisfaction and delighting of clients or customers. Decay sets in when innovation ceases.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIFE CYCLE</th>
<th>Personality</th>
<th>Culture, values, and beliefs</th>
<th>External economic and business environment</th>
<th>Mission and tasks</th>
<th>Management style</th>
<th>Organizational structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infancy</td>
<td>Prophet Visionaries Entrepreneurs</td>
<td>Passionate faith and belief in vision and &quot;product&quot; idea</td>
<td>Unique product and opportunity Vision of possible future</td>
<td>Designing organization and product</td>
<td>Autocratic management: one person or a group dominates decision May be rich in ideas depending on knowledge of leader</td>
<td>No organizational structure initially No written rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploration and start up</td>
<td>Barbarian</td>
<td>Direction and authority vested in visionary leader or prophet</td>
<td>Experimenting with product design and probing market or customers Identification of market and expansion</td>
<td>Getting product to market or process of transformation in place</td>
<td>Highly centralized control with very little delegation of power Direct action and single decision maker</td>
<td>Rudimentary management systems in place A few written rules Very small staff: 2-3 Some minor departmentalization Top leaders in control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion and growth</td>
<td>Builders Creators</td>
<td>Focus on efficiency, Competitive position, Effectiveness: Building markets, Exploration and expansion of relationships</td>
<td>Market penetration Searching for profits Maximizing flow of benefits</td>
<td>Decision system controlling for market and environmental risks and uncertainties Reducing costs Managing changes and planning for growth Strategic thinking</td>
<td>Data based decision making Focus on details: contracts, job descriptions and roles Performance measures, internal control systems Interpersonal relations important Long-term planning not as important yet, quality control too expensive</td>
<td>Organization is growing rapidly Departmentalization Policy and procedure manual important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maturity</td>
<td>Professionals Administrators Synergists</td>
<td>Search for balance Focus on efficiency and quality Expanding customer relationship and market position and maintaining commitments to long-term Relationships</td>
<td>Market stabilized, risk reduced Relationship mature and at high point Excellent competitive market position Net profits maximized or deficit reduced</td>
<td>Maintain customer relations and focus Maintain long-term planning Flexibility in operations and communications</td>
<td>Decisions based on strategic plans, cash flow management, project management Procedures Formalities of structure may create alienation and poor communication</td>
<td>Organization reaches most efficient stage More departments Control systems in place Performance reports, etc. Task force may be in place for strategic planning May see departmentalization Extensive policy and procedure manuals Increasing professional and staff support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stagnation and decline</td>
<td>Bureaucrats</td>
<td>Focus on form and power Wealth and status maximization at expense of customer relations</td>
<td>Decline in buyer-seller and customer relationships Market stagnation Search for new</td>
<td>Re-engineering Change-for-design strategies</td>
<td>Break down in internal communications Alienation of employees</td>
<td>Top-heavy management Sales over-departmentalized</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                          |                   |                                                                 |                                                                 |                                                                 |                                                                 |                                                                 |
An important element of the framework presented in Table II is the postulate that a customer relationship exchange-cycle is part of the long-term strategic plan from startup and exploration to expansion, to accelerated growth and maturity stages. These market place exchange relationships are said to start with product or brand awareness, followed by acceleration of the relationship with the clients (audiences) through succeeding phases of exploration, expansion, and finally long-term commitment (paid-up members, subscribers, donors, supporters, frequent repeat purchasers) (Dwyer, Shurr and Oh, 1987). In a competitive environment, the survival of the organization depends on establishing strong customer-seller exchange relationships and the continued recruitment of new customers loyal to the organization. Clearly, efficient organizational structures and learning systems suited to a management decision-making system that fosters a positive organizational culture must be in place. This is necessary to support growth and the continuous improvement in quality of service(s) to customers (internal and external) and to maximize the benefits or returns to society and stakeholders. The optimal structures are not a natural and logical outcome of growth. They are a result of deliberate choices made by leadership at different points in the life cycle of the organization. The structure of the organization at any point in time might be a reflection of the co-existence of negative (bureaucratic) and positive (innovative, collaborative and humanistic) factors. Elements of these management and decision systems are summarized very briefly in the cells under the columns entitled “management style” and “organizational structure” in Table II.

The research approach in this study will be the use of the framework and analysis sketched or suggested above to explore the process of birth, growth, maturity, death and or rejuvenation of performing arts companies in the Black Community of Canada. The study will focus on the Black Theatre Workshop of Montreal (BTW).

Case Study: BTW

The origins of Black theatre in Canada can be traced back to mid-nineteenth century in Nova Scotia and Montreal and possibly earlier. But modern Black theatre seems to have had its beginnings in Montreal in the 1930s, then later in the sixties and seventies making its appearances in Nova Scotia (1967), Toronto (1973), Vancouver (1977) (Sears and Knowles, 2004). Based on Canadian cultural agencies’ definitions of professionalism in the performing arts, professional Black theatre arguably started in Montreal and Toronto in the seventies: The Revue Theatre Montreal, The Black Theatre Workshop Montreal, Black Theatre Canada Toronto, and Theatre Fountainhead (Toronto). All of these companies were receiving grants from the Canada Council and municipal funding agencies by the mid to late seventies. But to date, of these original companies only the Black Theatre Workshop of Montreal continues to exist and is funded as a professional theatre company.

In Toronto, Black Theatre Canada was created in 1973. It closed its doors 15 years later in 1988. The company became exhausted and died in the early expansion stage. While it produced many new and established Black works, and got the attention of Black and white audiences it lacked that hard-headed focused barbarian leadership and critical management skills to survive growth problems and to overcome the professional biases of the Canada Council. The reality was that the Council never considered Black Theatre Canada to be a professional company. When Theatre Fountainhead came into existence in 1975 as a company of professional actors the Council decided that it would not fund two Black companies in Toronto (Henry, 2005, p.32-33). The two companies were forced into a strategic alliance, but the alliance failed and Black Theatre Canada died in the 1980s. Essentially, the two visions (community-based theatre and professional artist-run theatre) represented by two very different leadership
personalities could not be collapsed into a single vision. But, notwithstanding efforts by the Art Councils to save Theatre Fountainhead, it did not survive much beyond Black Theatre Canada.

I attribute the failure of these two companies in large measure to personality types of their founders, their choice of organizational structures. They were unable to escape their conditioned tendencies to a particular style of leadership. This restricted the growth path of the organization. In the particular case of Theatre Fountainhead it set the course for a fatal collision between its community support base and the artists. Theatre Fountainhead was a company of Black actors, all of who wanted to act. There were no administrators, no financial managers, no marketing experts, no persons who could negotiate the exchange of cultural gifts with the community whose art and culture it appropriated. The founding artistic director in an article in Canadian Theatre Review, Spring 2005, stated that he chose a title for the company that would be free from the name “Black.” He said: “I wanted to move away from the community-committee structure of the Black Theatre Workshop in Montreal towards an infrastructure based on professional merits, with a creative mission and vision not controlled by political and back-room social science associates.” He saw theatre as an institution run top down by the artistic director with the board of directors playing the spectator role. He held the view that “every one must trust the vision and creativity of the plan of the artistic director.” As a result of his autocratic management style, he faced open rebellion from board members who told him that they did not agree with his vision and the direction of his leadership. In his own words: “In Theatre Fountainhead, the board was a revolving door from its inception, and this created huge problems” (Henry, 2004, p.31).

Theatre Fountainhead was never able to develop an efficient administrative structure capable of managing and planning the transition from the infancy and startup stage to growth and expansion. All management and artistic decisions were concentrated in one person (the artistic director), so that when he resigned as artistic director in 1979 the organization was not in a position to manage the transition and conflicts. As the board became more involved, serious conflict erupted between the members of the board and the artistic director and creators over choice of plays. When the founding artistic director left, the gap between the board and the artistic directorship continued to widen. Henry welcomed the increased interest of the board but with dismay notes that the downside was that the board “began to interfere with the artistic process” (Henry, p. 33). He attributed differences between the board and the artists about the choice of types of plays and cultural value content to the triviality of a “largely middle class conservative West Indian Board…more concerned about a few cuss words,” as opposed to the merit of the work chosen by the artistic director. This unresolved conflict led to his (Henry’s) resignation from the board of directors. Finally, poor management and a lack of financial accountability led to the termination of the Company’s funding. We shall now examine the life cycle of the BTW to see why it has survived for more than 34 years while its counterparts in Toronto and elsewhere have failed.

The Infancy Stage of BTW

BTW came into existence at about the same time as Black Theatre Canada and Theatre Fountainhead. All three companies had similar missions and essentially faced the same threats, and opportunities. Why has the BTW survived for 34 years and succeeded in realizing a significant amount of its mission, whereas other Black companies have failed. In my view, the answers have to do with its mission and the community support for that mission, the leadership style, the decision-making management system that was put in place at the infancy stage of the cycle, the creation of a formal learning system to support its bottom up decision-making
structure; a broad-based support for and the passionate commitment of its members to the socio-cultural, educational, and artistic mission of the founding group (the Trinidad and Tobago Drama Committee).

On a summer afternoon in 1964 in a basement in the McGill student ghetto, a group of African and Caribbean scholars were engaged in a discourse about the possible negative effects of what they believed to be a denigrating presentation of a cultural and ceremonial folk dance called the “bongo.” They characterized the presentation as that of a “house nigger...for tourist entertainment.” After a long and heated debate, it was agreed that the social and cultural value of calypso, the steel band, carnival (“mas”), like the case in Trinidad, should be reconstructed here (in Montreal) as an expression of Caribbean culture and as a protection of West Indian Canadians against cultural colonialism. As the mission statement of BTW later put it: “to encourage and promote the development of a Black Canadian theatre, rooted in a literature that reflects the creative will of Black Canadians writers and artists.” Thus, the Trinidad and Tobago (T and T) Association was created, among other things, to implement this mission. The T and T drama committee was given the mandate to carry this out.

The benefits of a rich problem-solving and information base. The initial group that made up the committee consisted of a mix of professional artists teaching in Montreal or studying communications arts at Loyola, newly arrived immigrants with significant experience in Caribbean dance and the folk arts, plus university-educated managers and social scientists. There was a healthy balance of artistic and management resources available plus an ample supply of musicians from the islands who were always willing to be involved at no cost or just for the exposure and the promotion of the culture. Artistic leadership was initially provided by an experienced artistic director, Johnny Cayonne, a poet, writer, musician and director, who had spent several years as an artist in New York (Greenwich Village). He was supported by the President of the Association, a lecturer in economics at Sir George Williams University, who acted as the group’s administrator.

The Product

The product was unique to the Caribbean. It was symbolic for the Black community, but initially an exotic or idyllic experience for Canadian audiences. The group gave readings and made presentations from the plays of Derek Walcott (“Sea at Dauphin,” “Dream on Monkey Mountain”), Errol Hill (“Mal Cochon,” “Dance Bongo”). Pieces by Johnny Cayonne, two new scripts written for the group, entitled “Calypso in the Flesh” and “Fact and Fancy,” and Bayne’s “Black Experience” used the dance and music of the Caribbean to attract and entertain Black and White audiences in large numbers.

Management Style

The management style at this stage of the group was not autocratic. Rules were minimal. There were no written bylaws that governed the activities other than the mandate from the parent body. Decisions were made by committee. It was a very participatory process. The group read plays, analyzed them, and selected them by consensus. Tasks were delegated and divided up according to skills, expertise and willingness to contribute. The administrative director engaged the group in strategic discussions about the planned events and the direction of the group. Even at this early stage of its infancy, minutes were taken, documents filed and archived. Financial statements were prepared and reports presented to the general meetings of the association. Almost from the startup, a top-down-bottom-up decision-making system was embedded in the organizational culture. This democratic, group approach to decision making created the
foundation for group problem familiarization and solution; and it became the basis for the relatively smooth and orderly transition from community theatre through various stages to a professional theatre.

**BTW Exploration and Setup**

*The exploration stage.* The same cultural activism and vision that inspired the creation of the parent body, motivated the leadership of the BTW to adopt a more global mission based on Blackness as an identity element in the search for recognition and as a condition for participation in the Canadian dream. Unlike Theatre Fountainhead, its visionaries embraced the name “Black” in the name of the organization: Black Theatre Workshop. The company has stubbornly resisted all attempts to change or remove it. The letters patent of the Black Theatre Workshop states that the purposes of the company are the provision of opportunities in the performing arts for Black artists: to act as their agents, to teach and instruct in the Black art form, to build a repertoire of works in the Black experience, to undertake stage productions of Black plays and other Black creative works, and to encourage Black creative writings for stage, radio, television and films. In these respects it does not differ in its core business from the mission of its counterparts. But, in addition, it purports to educate and reconstruct Black and Caribbean culture as a valuable aspect of Canadian culture. The BTW was created out of the Black immigrant communities of Montreal and drew its leadership from a radical university-educated group. Its creation represented a response to the situation of the new and dynamic Black community as a minority in Montreal. It was influenced by the Black Power and Pan-African movements of the time and like its parent body (Trinidad and Tobago Association) is committed to the promotion of “a truly harmonious and multicultural society” (bylaws, BTW). Its mission statement states that “the company strives to create a greater cross cultural understanding by its presence and the intrinsic value of its work.”

In February 1969, two professional artists (both actors and professional arts teachers) were invited to teach acting and moving. Based on the work of these two community artists, in December 1969 the T and T Association approved a plan from its drama committee to establish a permanent workshop. This workshop was formally launched in February 1970 with a reading of Black poets and writers. The group was now moving beyond the mere re-affirmation of its Caribbean culture. The cultural activists in a partnership with professional artists were now seeking recognition beyond the boundaries of the Caribbean community towards professionalism. The watershed in this development was the decision in 1971 to produce Professor Lorris Elliott’s new play “How Now Black Man,” under the direction of Jeff Henry, a Black professional dance choreographer (NTS). He requested that casting be open to all Blacks, not just members of the Association. In the spirit of the Black power movement at the time, the Association decided to bill the show, Black Workshop presents “How Now Black Man” by Lorris Elliot. This was the beginning of the “Black Theatre Workshop.” But it was about to face its first serious challenge on the road to professionalism: the conflict between professional artistic autocracy and community-based theatre.

*The birthing of the BTW.* The professional artists wanted a theatre run by professionally trained practitioners. This had general support in the T and T Association group. But conflict reared its head when the professionals argued that the casts and other artists from “How Now Blackman” constituted a company that derived its origins from the presence of these professionals. This drew strong resistance from the drama committee members who considered it a take-over bid. This could have resulted in the demise of the fledgling movement towards a professional theatre. But the Trinidad and Tobago Association kept its focus on the real objective, the creation of a literature and black theatre rooted in the community. What it wanted maximized
was the utility derived by the community as a whole. So it stepped aside, believing that the universe was unfolding as it had planned it: the association would become irrelevant as these cultural initiatives became capable of standing alone. Thus, unlike the situation with Theatre Fountainhead, a compromise was reached and an acrimonious dispute over individual group ownership was avoided. The association gave the new company $500 to obtain a charter and wished it well. The drama committee was dissolved and became the Black Theatre Workshop in 1971.

BTW obtained its charter in 1971. Jeff Henry, who was a strong advocate for a theatre managed by professional artists left for a job in Toronto. Legally, the charter required a board with a minimum of three directors (president, secretary and treasurer). But the management structure he left behind was flawed. The initial bylaws created a management committee that effectively had all the powers and that was dominated by professional artists (the executive producer and the artistic director and two senior instructors). Although non-voting, they represented more than 36 percent of the places on the board. On paper the board looked like a rubber-stamp sub-structure that was not expected to “interfere with the artistic process.” The new organization was production oriented with no management system in place, no capacity for sustaining an organization. For a year nothing happened. The Canada Council terminated a start-up grant it had essentially given to Jeff Henry as a professional. Then in the summer of 1973 the former administrator of the T and T drama committee was asked to take over the leadership of the company in the capacity of president and executive producer. This launched what might be described as the expansion and growth stage of the BTW. Just at this time Jeff Henry on his arrival in Toronto began setting up a company of practicing Black professional artists, Theatre Fountainhead.

Expansion and Growth

The year 1974 marks the beginning of the expansion and growth stage of the BTW. The style of management adopted was more that of the synergist rather than any particular single type (barbarian, builders/creators, professionals and administrators, bureaucrats). The minutes of meetings and reports show that while the members supported the vision and direction pursued by the president/executive producer that it wanted a collaborative system of decision making. A board was installed consisting of president, executive producer, vice-president, artistic director, secretary, treasurer and officers at large. The organization reinforced its group decision-making culture and embarked on a strategic reconstruction of the organization. In practice it abandoned the autocratic leadership style. Board functions, responsibilities, and duties were written to establish ownership fully in the hands of the board. It took full authority in the hiring process. In keeping with general practice, it took sole responsibility for hiring the administrative director and the artistic director, both of whom were required to report to the board, and were accountable directly to the president/executive producer. The organizational structure that emerged and lasted until 1988 is illustrated in Diagram 1, below. Since the executive producer was also the president and chaired the management committee, the board was firmly in control. In practice, the board approved of and made all the decisions. A perusal of the minutes and reports of the organization show that in this period 1974 to 1987, the board was a working board, supported by a volunteer membership of supporters, actors, and technical supporters.
By the mid-seventies the company had attracted a number of Black professional artists, some of who were training in professional theatre programs in Montreal (Dawson College, Vanier, Concordia, McGill, National Theatre School, Marianopolis). Black Theatre Workshop had become their only hope for practicing their art and employment in a city where White directors, even those teaching in the institutions they attended, did not practice mixed/blind casting. After several years of working for no fees or just small honoraria in the hope of building a home (BTW), the time would come when they would need to be paid to provide for them a mere subsistence survival. It was also becoming clear that the company would have to generate significant revenues if it were to fulfill its commitments to providing support for Black artists and their work.

Spurred on by an aggressive and dedicated leadership, in 1974, the company applied to the Canada Council and got an Exploration Grant of $5,000 for each of two consecutive years. It used these grants to develop its performance capacity: acting skills, marketing and administrative capability; and to position itself competitively in the market for funding and for
audiences. With a solid administrative structure in place, the company turned its attention to its artistic mission and the challenge of excellence. It sought and got assistance from Professors Bertrand Henry (director and chair of Dawson Professional Theatre School), Terry Donald (currently chair of John Abbott Professional Theatre School); technical help from the Centaur Theatre (Peter Smith and Steve Hawkins), performance space and great encouragement from Arleigh Peterson, artistic director of the former Revue Theatre, and rehearsal and office space from the Black Studies Center. In 1974, the company launched a Festival of Black Theatre at the Revue Theatre, presenting plays by a member and resident playwright director, David Edgecombe’s “Sunuvitch” and “For Better for Worse”; also Wole Soyinka’s “The Swamp Dwellers”; C. Bayne’s “The Black Experience”; Yvonne Greer’s “Malcolm as He Lived”; and Errol Sitahal’s “Sea Shango.” The audiences were supportive, and the reviews were exciting, in the critical range from encouraging to good. In 1976, Lorne Elder’s “Ceremonies in Dark Old Men” directed by Terry Donald played to sold-out houses at Centaur Theatre (September, 1976). In 1977, the company formed the core of the Canadian theatre arts contingent representing the Canadian sector of the North American Black diaspora at the Second World Conference of the Black and African Arts and Culture, Lagos, Nigeria. The resident director’s play (“Strong Current”) was presented at the Festival. On the company’s return to Montreal, it played to sold-out houses and critical acclaim at Centaur I, June 13-26 1977. In that year, the Canada Council awarded the company a professional grant for $2,500, a mere half of the $5,000 exploration grant it had awarded the company the previous year. Notwithstanding its disappointment at the amount of the award, the company had now built a participatory management system and the artistic capacity for further growth and improvement. In a memorandum dated August 11976, the president/executive producer called on the members to make the next step towards professionalism, a term that for BTW’s leadership meant excellence not necessarily the employment of card-carrying artists.

In 1979 when it seemed that interest was lagging, the president/executive producer organized a series of strategic workshops to discuss the pros and cons of professionalism and what it implied for BTW and its mission, the need for a long-term strategic plan, and to develop the policies that would govern the organization as a socially responsible professional company. The BTW files show that this was a very exhaustive study scanning the strengths and weaknesses of the company. It provided a detailed plan of action and corrective measures, including an assessment of the needs of individual members and internal plans for developing acting, technical and directing skills. Finally, a vote was taken and it was decided that the company would shift its focus from cultural recreation to becoming a professional theatre company. The democratic participatory decision-making process and, no doubt, the performance and box office successes of the company helped it to emerge intact once more.

The period of 1979-1992 exhibited consistent growth. The organization was relentless in its search for funding from all levels of government. In January 1981 the company received a grant for $7,500 from the Quebec Ministry of Cultural Affairs. The Canada Council agreed to fund the organization professionally in 1983. The conditions were that the company hire a professionally recognized artistic director and provide the Council with written confirmation of the appointment. By 1983, the board made a firm commitment to running BTW as a professional theatre. It hired its first full time professional artistic director, Lorena Gale, beginning September 15 1983 (Letter of appointment dated October 12, 1983). In July 1984, the executive producer met with the Multicultural Directorate and the Canada Council and negotiated a financing arrangement. The terms of the arrangement were that the Directorate would fund BTW on a sustaining grant basis for three years. Each year the amount would be reduced and Canada Council would pick up the difference. However, this was subject to the company’s success in the competition for annual
The company was expected to show evidence that it was striving for continuity, image, identity, and consistency. More specifically, it was expected:

1. to consolidate its administrative structure;
2. to stabilize its performance space arrangements;
3. to maintain its current dynamic artistic program:
   - a professional season
   - its school tour
   - acting workshops;
4. to diversify the company’s fund raising.

The grants for the season 1984-1985 from the Secretary of State and Canada Council were $26,000 and $15,000 respectively.

The artistic programs continued to flourish at a level of intense enjoyment that impelled the Montreal Gazette (January 1985) to advise theatre goers: “Do yourself a favour: go see ‘Colored Girls’”; and a Black Montreal school principal to write in a local magazine: “Black Theatre Workshop is the Soul of Black people” (Focus, 1982). But the company began to have problems with what I call the artistic temperament and the inclination of some artistic directors to show preference for a model of theatre that is essentially an autocracy of the artistic director. That is to say, that all the functions of the organization tend to be shrunk into a singularly production-oriented process. Thus, while the innovative and creative processes continue to produce new and innovative work, the management and marketing systems too feeble to sustain or keep the creative spaces alive. Only one half of the organization is functioning. Unfortunately, the funding agencies having defined their role as the funding of art (and hence the artistic director) tended to support that type of model. The BTW board resisted that type of artistic style in 1984 an1985. But mindful of the pressures and mandatory criteria to have and retain a recognized professional artistic director, BTW changed its governance structures in 1987 to give almost sole power for running the company back to the artistic director. In 1987, the function of executive producer was stripped away from the president at the demands of the new artistic director. In a meeting of the board held Sunday, June 19, 1988, it was agreed that once the board had approved the budget it had in fact accepted responsibility for raising the money; and that the artistic director was responsible for managing the budget and being accountable for it. Moreover, the artistic director assumed responsibility for hiring all staff (general manager and other staff). In my view, the board had effectively become the handmaiden of the artistic director, a mere guarantor of resources. The implicit expectation that boards would be responsible for simply going out and raising funds to close program deficits did not make for good economic choices in competitive markets for funds and entertainment. This was clearly a step backward.

Initially, this transfer of power from the board to the administration did not affect the quality of the work. With critically appraised plays such as the “Coloured Museum”(1988), “Smile Orange”(1990), the golden period of quality productions continued but with a lesser intensity. On the other hand, the school tours that were launched in the early eighties began to expand and increasingly became a very vital part of BTW’s programming, in response to demand from Black teachers and families. However, the school tours were not considered professional by the Canada Council. Moreover, the artistic director’s strategic decision to build a theatre art form out of the Black local talent, rooted in the community rather than card carrying professionals, had the effect of producing seasons of second stage productions in non-professional spaces. This did not resonate well with the Canada Council's criteria for assessing professionalism. The weakened board in its relative isolation and the organization as a whole began to loose energy.
The artistic director became frustrated and lost confidence in the board’s capacity to meet his basic life needs (Letter from the artistic director to president dated June 21, 1990) and to lose trust that Canada Council would ever live up to its funding agreements, or respect his artistic judgment. The relationship between Canada Council and the artistic director exploded in 1990. The Council called the president and the artistic director to Ottawa to what was essentially a court martial proceedings conducted by the theatre officer. In his report of 1990, the artistic director accused the Council of being more concerned with the technical details of professionalism than his development of a Black Canadian theatre and literature. He argued that he needed the flexibility to be creative and take risks with out being punished. He said that the community had become disillusioned with the Canada Council-type professional union artists who had no connection with the community. The company’s files show, in a letter dated August 27 1992, that the Canada Council and BTW met and that both parties agreed to work more closely and in a spirit of openness and transparency. Notwithstanding this, the bottom line was that the funding situation with respect to Canada Council worsened, offsetting gains from the province and Montreal. The frustration of the artistic director increased, then spilled over into the Board and in 1994 he resigned to teach at Dawson. Stagnation and possible decline threatened.

Avoiding bureaucracy and stagnation. The organization reached a new phase in its cycle of development. Between 1994 and 2000, it changed artistic directors three times, each one, among other things, expressing frustration with the Canada Council funding and demands. The organization was being forced into a bureaucratic mode of management. A sort of isomorphic administrative system was being imposed upon it to meet the reporting requirements of external funding agencies. Government funding agencies expected a deficit reduction plan, and some demanded annual audits for even budgets of less than $100,000. Income-stabilization procedures punishable on default were applied. In the funding formulae there was the expectation that the company would find and retain a professional theatre space in the very short run. All this took place at the same time BTW was being expected to produce quality theatre and to share the punishing decreases in funded revenues across the arts sector. Fortunately, the funding agencies in Quebec were prepared to be more flexible and encouraging of BTW. They increased funding and praised the artistic director “pour l’énorme travail qu’il a abbatu, surtout, pour sa détermination à faire du Black Theatre Workshop une compagnie respectée de son publique et de son milieu théâtral” (Letter to president dated August 6, 1990).

During the period 1994-1996 the quality of the work continued to excite. The company delighted Montreal audiences with its ensemble piece “Children of Kush Are Rising” and Joseph Walker’s “Ododo.” But there were structural problems in BTW that led to significant cumulative deficits by 1996. Because the artistic director of the company had sole responsibility for managing the approved budget, internal financial controls on program expenditures were very weak. There is no evidence in the organization files for 1994-1996 that there were monthly cash-flow statements and projections presented to the board. By 1997 the Canada Council declared BTW a company at risk because its cumulated deficit had exceeded its technically allowed limit of 10 percent of gross revenues for that year. It was penalized by a 13 percent cut in funding reducing its funding from the agency from a level of $30,000 to $24,000. The overall deficit was in the order of $56,000 in 1996 (Financial Statements of June 1997). The board moved to take immediate action to avoid decline. It decided to re-engineer the company.

Re-engineering BTW

In the 1995-2000 period, the BTW had to overcome huge obstacles. It was indeed on the brink of bankruptcy and closing. The Gazette theatre critic reported that the company was in trouble.
The new president, Jacklin Webb (1994), appeared on CBC television to assure the public that the company was not going to die (interview with J. Webb) and that the company intended to pay its debts in full. The small board took charge. The president sought the assistance of two Black financial consultants (Harold Kakou and Akute Azu) to manage the finances of the company. A severe set of cash-flow controls were put in place. The president monitored every transaction and worked very closely with the financial consultants and the past president. Notwithstanding this crisis, the school tours sold well, and a joint production with the theatre company Tessi Duniya of Rahul Varma’s “Counter Offensive” filled the seats at the Monument National Theatre and received critical acclamation. Between 1996 and 1998, partly as a result of drastic cuts in productions and savings on salaries, the company was able to reduce its deficit by 35 percent. It was also able to arrange with its bank a line of credit that enabled it to manage its cash flows more efficiently. In addition to term deposits ($6,000) held at its bank, board members provided personal collateral to back the increased line of credit. Also, by private initiatives (Vision Celebration Gala and net profits resulting from the marketing of performances of the Harlem Dance Theatre as part of the season of Les Grands Ballets canadiens de Montréal), the company was able to generate new revenues in the order of $30,000 (Financial Reports of 1997, 1998; Administrator Reports of 1997, 1998). The stage was now set for a complete revitalization of the management. Thus, in 1997 the company embarked on a process of self-examination and renewal.

It would seem that the organization had jumped the maturity stage in the life cycle and was entering the decline stage. It was now imperative that this small but dynamic group of professionals and board members reverse the process. The board had to find a way for the artistic functions of the company to be free to experiment and to be innovative, expand and be competitive without negating the larger function and responsibilities of management. It had to do this while itself avoiding being bureaucratic and creating a top-heavy approach to the management of the organization. A strategic workgroup, which included a member of the financial consultants and the past president, was asked to form a task force to design a strategic plan for bringing about change. Three important elements were identified, administrative reorganization, marketing the organization, artistic and audience development. The group drew on a rich body of information found in two earlier studies: a marketing research study of the BTW by Mark Baldry (Baldry, 1990) under the direction of Professor Annamma Joy, and an article by Joy and Bayne (1993) published in Advances in Non-profit Marketing (“From Community Theatre to Professional Theatre”). The work group generated the first of four comprehensive strategic plans produced for the company in the six year period 1997 to 2003: Restructuring BTW: Strategic Plan, 1997; Grundy Marketing study, 1998; The Cann-Barlow Strategic Report, 2000; and the Cann-Barlow Strategic Report, 2003.
As a result of these studies the board was restructured and increased from four to seven members. An organization plan was developed and the following changes were made:

1. A deficit reduction plan was put in place in 2001.
2. A clearly defined set of job descriptions for the board were developed: personnel reviews and performance evaluation, financial management, fundraising, event management, policy formulation, grievance and conflict management, public relations.
3. The executive committee of the board was revitalized and given the responsibilities to formulate policies for action based on the various strategic workshop reports. It acts as a steering committee and carries out executive functions on behalf of the board between board meetings.
4. A qualified full-time professional general manager has been added to the staff with the power to monitor and implement the financial policies of the board. The general manager provides administrative services to the artistic function and manages the resources allocated to that function by the board. He/she is directly accountable to the board and responsible to the board for all the administrative aspects of the organization.
5. The artistic director is responsible for all the artistic aspects of the company, and for carrying out the artistic mission of the company subject to the financial constraints (deficit reduction policies and limits applied to program budgets) set by the board and implemented on its behalf by the general manager: The artistic director is directly accountable to the board for the artistic aspects of the company.
6. The board of directors (personnel committee) is now responsible for all hiring except those delegated to the artistic director in the by-laws. Detailed job descriptions and contracts are prepared by personnel committee and approved by board.
7. Financial services are contracted out and provided to the board and its administrators by an external finance and accounting firm (Integrac): monthly accounting services; monthly cash flow and cash flow projections; monthly comparative financial statements. A petty cash policy is in place and monitored by the board and Integrac.
8. An integrated filing system is being put in place, relating board minutes and documents, to reports, correspondence and queries, and activity summaries.
9. An accounting and financial system has been put in place at the offices of the company. Simple Accounting is replaced by the nonprofit version of Quickbooks.
10. Up-to-date office technology software and communications equipment are installed: a telephone network, a computer network system, a customized FileMaker system, and a website
11. A policy manual has been created. New Policies formerly put in place: employment, performance evaluation, grievance, sick leave and leave of absence, conflict of interest, awards criteria and policies, etc.
12. A marketing and development coordinator has been added to the staff with the responsibility for generating new funds; developing and maintaining relationship marketing strategies with respect to peers, supporters, sponsors, donors, public and private funders; also responsible for general publicity and promotion of the company and its programs.

The changes in the relationships and processes that took place between 1974 and the present time (2005) are reflected in the general logic of Diagrams 1 to 4. Diagram 2 reflects the increased importance of external influencers at 1997, and the improved authority of the board as compared with the situation represented in Diagram 1. But the distance between the board and sponsors, funders, and government agencies remained evident as indicated by the broken line between the board and external agencies in Diagram 2. After the Cann-Barlow strategic workshops in 2000, the leadership took action to reposition the executive committee and refocus on the duties and responsibilities of the board (see Diagram 3). In keeping with these
strategic workshops, the board reestablished the central and fundamental responsibility of the executive committee to monitor the performance of the organization. Diagram 4 is more specific. It shows the internal organizational relations and functions, as well as stronger connections of the organization with external stakeholders. This is representative of the changes that have taken place in 2003, 2004 and are still going on.

Diagram 2: Addressing the Reporting Problem in BTW

Diagram showing the relationships between different roles and responsibilities within the organization, including the board, funders, sponsors, government agencies, administrative director, artistic director, management committee, services to board of governors, arts creation, production, and programs, and services to publics, reports, etc.
Diagram 3: Outline Structure of a Not-for-Profit Theatre Organization with Professional Staff

**Authorities Having Jurisdiction**

- **BOARD**
  - Trustees who vote for the integrity of the organization:
    - Approve Mission
    - CEO
    - Budget
    - Advocate

- **EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE**
  - Officers who oversee the process of the board and the organization

**Volunteers**

- Serve as unpaid staff

**Professional Theatre Industry**

- **EXECUTIVE STAFF (CEOs)**
  - Manage/coordinate the process of the board and the organization
  - Implement:
    - Mission
    - Contracts
    - Budgets
    - Administrative

- **STAFF**
  - Liaise with Committees at the behest of executive staff

Source: Cann and Barlow, 2000
Summary and Conclusions

Prior to 2000 there was very little direct linkage between the board and the funding agencies. Diagram 4 shows that the principal communication linkage between BTW and the funding agencies (CALQ, Heritage Canada, CACUM, Canada Council) was via the CEOs. That is to say, follow up and reporting on funded activities were administrative responsibilities that were not monitored as carefully by the board as they should have been. Thus, as a last resort, frequently delays in reporting to the funding agencies had to be drawn to the attention of the board by the agencies themselves.
Also, there were gaps in communication links between the organization and its supporters, friends, and peers that resulted in discontinuities in the audience development process from the awareness stage through exploration, expansion to the commitment stage (Baldry, 1990; Joy and Bayne, 1993) drew attention to this problem and the need to address it. Joy writes about the imbalance that developed in the gift-exchange relationship between the BTW and the Black community. On the artistic side, Sutton (1988-1994) attempted to solve this problem by instituting a long-term community-based program of theatre using the second stage production for encouraging community involvement and for training actors and directors. The school tours were pursued vigorously for education purposes and as a strategy for developing future audiences. Fleurette Fernandez (1995-1997) continued the work of attracting youth to the creative process and young audiences by adding a hip hop element to her productions (“Children of Kush,” and “Ododo”).

On the administrative side, in 2002 the board added to the staff a marketing and development coordinator. It also took steps to shorten the response cycle with respect to queries and reporting. In general it sought to make the information and communication flows and relationships more efficient and effective. It has made weekly meetings of the management committee mandatory, clarified lines of authority and set in place a grievance policy. It has reorganized the filing system, updated its data processing software, automated the accounting and financial reporting system, and enabled it to deliver reports on a monthly basis and by program. It has freed up internal creative capacity by “sourcing” out the financial and accounting operations to Integrac. In addition, Integrac now provides financial reports and consultations directly to the finance and executive committees of the board on a monthly basis, and keeps track of all reporting situations to the various agencies. This improves the board’s capacity and capability to monitor the performance of the organization and its CEOs. Integrac also provides timely information to the artistic director and the general manager. The board proposes to establish a stronger and more direct links with the Funding Agencies through the president and or the vice-president (BTW Board of Governors Administrative Report 2005). Diagram 6 shows a board that has positioned itself to oversee the operations of the organization more effectively and to respond more quickly to change.

The single most important index of the success of the re-engineering of BTW post 2000 is the degree of deficit reduction achieved. At June 1996, BTW’s cumulative deficit was $55,705, well in excess of 10 percent of its gross revenues. By 1998, it was reduced by 35 percent to $37,231. The deficit at June 2004 was less than five percent of gross revenues. The stated objective is to reach a zero deficit by June 2007. This improvement is partly a result of the diversification of funding and improvements in box-office receipts due to audience increases, increases in donations, steady increase in the Vision Celebration Gala profits since 2002. The changes in box office receipts, Vision Celebration profits, and donations seem to be directly traceable to the new marketing strategies and the establishment of the marketing and development function. (See the BTW Report on Capacity Building Grant: Heritage Canada, 2005, in BTW office files.) Another important factor contributing to the successful re-engineering of BTW is the relocation of its offices to the MAI Cultural Centre with access in the same building to a shared 100-seat theatre space. In its new facilities, BTW has sole control of a large rehearsal space that it uses to rehearse its school tours and shows, for the training of the participants in its Youth Works program, for its playwriting workshops, and that it rents to professional groups in the city for rehearsals and meetings. The fees it collects make a significant contribution to the rental cost of the facility. Finally, the organization has a home where its loyal supporters can find it, and where Black artists can meet among themselves and with other artists to work.
This case study seems to support the hypothesis stated earlier that there is a strong relationship between the various life cycle stages of an organization and the style of its leadership. It would seem that this applies not only to the private sector from which our guidelines in Table II are derived, but also to small performing arts organizations like the BTW. It would seem that the key explanatory factor is that certain types of leadership personalities tend to favour one type of management structure more than others. Since people make decisions for organizations their choices determine the organization’s performance in the environments in which they are embedded. But as the organization moves from birth to maturity, its structure changes and it requires different types of choices and the appropriate leadership to make those choices. Synergistic leadership approaches seem to allow the best qualities of the different types of leader personalities to be applied to the changing relationships between the organization and its environment (Barbarian to Bureaucrats, Miller, 1989) This seems to have been the reason that BTW has been able to recover on several occasions from serious financial and leadership crises.

There is a strong suggestion that there should be a reasonable degree of departmentalization of the artistic and management functions, but that the administrative function must be clearly defined as a service, and the performance of the general manager evaluated on such a basis by the board. Its internal clients must be the artistic and development functions. The artistic function should be given freedom to create, innovate and experiment but should not include the management of budgets. Fiscal responsibility is in the domain of the board. In my view it must not be surrendered to other functional areas Moreover, artistic freedom must be subject to size and other resource constraints of the company. Artistic directors of BTW seem to have been able to sustain many instances of high quality and delightful theatre creations. This has contributed to the company’s good reputation as an arts institution over a period of 34 years. However, it would seem that in those instances in which the board of BTW has abdicated its fiscal responsibility or ceased to control it rigorously that the organization has slipped into deep financial crisis. Autocratic management systems and leadership styles have had negative effects in BTW. This leadership style should be avoided at all levels of the company.

Small companies like BTW must exploit the advantages for better communication that is possible by virtue of their small size and the proximity of workers to each other in the small office spaces they occupy. Also, because of the absence of highly structured departments, the small organization should exploit the flatness of the organization, and develop office practices and a communication system that enable it to respond more quickly than large organizations can to volatility in the market or changes in government funding policies and the economy. This would require an adaptive quality management style based on a participative learning system (Shrivastava and Grant, 1985). BTW has in place a management committee that can be used effectively to implement this type of management system. The minutes reveal discussions of office procedures, evaluation procedures, office communication practices, ethics, grievance issues, attendance of training workshops and conferences all of which suggest that individual members’ knowledge and group-decisions norms are sought and used in the organization for information acquisition, screening and circulation. Also, there is evidence that the knowledge base in the organization is specific, problem focused, current and historical, and communicated through official memos, group discussions and meetings. It would seem that BTW leadership has been able to sustain a high quality of theatre and artistic creativity and freedom, while at the same time restructuring the organization to address changes in the environment in which it is embedded. It has done this by enforcing a degree of departmentalization between the artistic functions and the administrative functions, but it has encouraged improved internal communication practices and a holistic approach to problem solving. It has retained within its control the responsibility for financial stability of the organization. The leadership style is
synergistic, enabling it to be more flexible in its approach to problem familiarization and its search for solutions. As a result the company seems most likely to avoid decline and to increase its contributions to art and culture for the greater benefit of its publics.

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